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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(J)(1996).

Did the trial court error in granting defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds
that plaintiffs had failed to give adequate notice under the Governmental Immunity Act.
This issue was preserved by virtue of the motion, memoranda, and order of dismissal on
the issue. (R. 20, 22, 32, 83, and 166).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's grant of a dismissal for failure to comply with the notice
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act is a conclusion of law which is reviewed
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's decision. Rushton v. Salt Lake
County, 1999 UT 36, ^ 17, 977 P.2d 1201: Larson v. Park Citv Mun. Corp.. 955 P.2d 343,
345 (Utah 1998). See also Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d 666, 668 (Utah App. 1994).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASES
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 are implicated in this matter and
therefore are reproduced in their entirety in Addendum A to this brief.
The following cases have previously addressed this issue in Utah and must be
1

considered in ths present appeal. Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 1999 UT 36, ^ 17, 977
P.2d 1201; Moreno v. Board of Educ. of Jordan School Dist.. 926 P.2d 886 (Utah 1996);
Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority. 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980); Scarborough v. Granite
School Dist. 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975); Bellonio v. Salt Lake City Corp. 911 P.2d 1294,
1297 (Utah App. 1996); Bischel y. Merritt. 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995); Brittan v.
State. 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994). Copies of these cases are attached hereto in
Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on September
27, 1998.] (R. 1). The accident occurred in Kane County, bul the lawsuit was transferred
to Washington County because the defendant Mark McPherson was an employee of Kane
County and Kane County was a named party. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that
McPherson operated his motor vehicle into a motor vehicle being driven by Dale
Wheeler, the husband of the plaintiff Mary Wheeler. Mrs. Wheeler and Ms. Srbova were
occupants of Mr. Wheeler's vehicle. Plaintiffs complained that defendant McPherson
failed to maintain proper control of his vehicle, failed to maintain a proper lookout and
failed to yield to on-coming traffic and was otherwise negligent.
As a result of the accident, plaintiffs claimed to have incurred special damages

]

For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, this court must take the allegations of
plaintiffs complaint as true. Hannon City, Inc. v. Nielsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167
(Utah 1995).
2

including medical expenses in excess of $3,000.00, as well as loss of income. Plaintiffs
also pled for general damages. Plaintiffs maintained that as a direct approximate result of
the defendants' negligence that defendants caused plaintiffs permanent impairment,
permanent disability and loss of earning capacity. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant
McPherson was at all relevant times an agent and employee of Kane County acting in the
scope of that agency and employment.
Prior to the complaint being filed September 27, 1999, Plaintiffs had filed a notice
of claim with the Kane County Board of Commissioners by sending a notice on February
11, 1999, to each and every commissioner individually, as well as to the insurance carrier
which insured Kane County.2 See notices of claim attached in Addendum C (R. 64-69).
Thus, the notices of claim were submitted to the governing body of Kane County less than
five months after the accident occurred and seven months prior to any required notice of
claim being required. The notices were sent to the Kane County offices and received by
the county clerk's office. Holly Ramsay, an employee of the Kane County Clerk's office,
signed for the certified notices. (R. 71-72). Later, Ms. Ramsay would file the only
affidavit in support of defendants' motion stating that no notices were "filed" with the
Kane County Clerk. The affidavit does not state that no notices were delivered to the

2

Prior to 1998, the proper persons upon whom a notice of claim could be served
were the County Commissioners, as the governing body of Kane County. Yates v. Vernal
Family Health Ctr.. 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980). Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 was amended
and the amendment became effective in May of 1998. Section 63-30-13 still requires
notice to be filed "with the governing body," according to the requirements of §63-30-11.
3

Kane County Clerk's office, as Ms. Ramsay's signature on the return slips would clearly
rebut such an assertion.
Subsequent to the notices of claim being submitted, a Kane County commissioner
contacted plaintiffs' counsel and discussed the submission of the notices of claim and
asked particularly concerning the demands of plaintiffs. Mr. Peatross, plaintiffs' attorney,
indicated that the matter should be submitted to Kane County's insurance carrier. .See
Affidavit of Mr. Peatross R. 58). In a letter dated March 8, 1999, an attorney who had
been retained by Kane County, Ms. Hutton, acknowledged receipt of the notices of claim
and requested further information regarding plaintiffs' injuries and submitted to plaintiff
a consent to release medical information. The letter did note: "Please be advised this does
not constitute an acceptance or denial of the 'notice of claim,' nor does it confirm or
verify the sufficiency of the claimants' notice of claim as required by the governmental
immunity act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq.".See letter of Ms. Hutton attached hereto
as Addendum D.
In a subsequent letter of March 20, 1999, Collin R. Winchester, the Kane County
Attorney, wrote Mr. Peatross and indicated the claim had been turned over to adjusters
who had in turn retained Ms. Hutton. The March 20, 1999 letter indicated: "Please direct
all other communication and correspondence to Ms. Hutton." See attached letter attached
as Addendum E. All communication with Kane County from that time forward was
directed to Ms. Hutton per Kane County Attorney Winchester's request. (R. 60).

4

Course of Proceedings. Plaintiffs filed their complaint on September 27, 1999,
one day before any notice of claim would have been required. Plaintiffs complaint was
answered by Kane County. Defendant then served upon Plaintiffs a set of interrogatories,
after which six subpoenas for medical records, as well as corresponding notices of
records depositions were served upon defendant.
On March 16, 2000, defendants filed a motion to dismiss upon the basis that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction as the plaintiff had failed to comply with the requirements
of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (3)(b)(ii)(B)( 1998). The motion was supported by the
affidavit of Holly Ramsay. Defendants filed a memorandum in support of the motion to
dismiss (R. 22). In opposition, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the
motion (R. 32), as well as a Rule 56 (f) affidavit seeking further discovery (R. 30).
Defendants thereafter responded with a reply memorandum (R.87), as well as a
memorandum in opposition to rule 56 (f) affidavit. (R.83).
A hearing was held on this matter August 10, 2000, whereupon the court granted
the motion. An order thereon was filed August 28, 2000. (R. 166) Notice of appeal was
thereafter filed on September 8, 2000 (R. 170).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs fulfilled the purpose of the notice of claim requirements. There is no
question but that the notice of claim was received by those exercising the function of
adjusting and litigating the claims against Kane County. The notice was timely, proper as

5

to form, and delivered to the Kane County Clerk's office. Thereafter, within the purview
of his duties and with the authority vested in him as Kane County Attorney, Carl
Winchester expressly directed that any and all communication or correspondence should
be directed to attorney Hutton, who had been retained to defend the county. As the record
before the Court shows, Ms. Hutton had in fact received the notice of claim as of that
time. As a result, plaintiffs were secure in their belief that the notice of claim resided
with the proper authority to investigate and adjust the claim.
Utah appellate courts have stated that in interpreting the notice requirements of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the statute will be interpreted consistent with the
overall purpose of the act itself. The primary purpose of the notice and claim requirement
is to afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity to timely investigate, and if
appropriate, settle claims brought against governmental entities. That purpose was clearly
fulfilled under the present circumstances as the notice of claim was filed well before the
one year deadline for filing the claim. However, the county attorney acknowledged
receipt of the same and directed all further correspondence to go to Ms. Hutton. The
purposes of the notice of claim requirements had therefore been fulfilled.
This conclusion is supported by a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in Bischel
v. Meritt 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995) wherein a plaintiff called the county attorney's
office and was told to send her notice of claim to that office. The plaintiff in Bischel
followed the instruction of the county attorney's office, but when the lawsuit was

6

brought, the county moved to dismiss because the notice of claim had not been served
upon the county commissioners. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
dismissal and found that the notice of claim to the county attorney was valid. The Court
of Appeals based this decision, in large part, on the significant fact that the attorney in the
county attorney's office had verified her apparent authority to receive the notice on behalf
of the county commission. Plaintiffs ask this court to affirm the reasoning ofBischel and
apply that reasoning to the present case.
The present circumstances, as well as applicable law, show that the County
Attorney is empowered to act on behalf of the county, particularly in the defense of
claims made against the county. As such, the fact that the County Attorney indicated that
all further correspondence and communication should go through Ms. Hutton, coupled
with the fact plaintiffs knew that Ms. Hutton already possessed the notice of claim and
had requested further information, leads to a conclusion that the notice of claim was
effectual in this case.
Further, the plaintiffs maintain that additional discovery should have been allowed
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(f). It is universally held that when matters
outside the pleadings are considered in a motion under Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the motion is properly treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.
Plaintiffs motion to dismiss was supported by an affidavit. The defendant's opposition
was likewise supported with an affidavit. As a result, the trial court considered matters
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outside the pleadings, yet the trial court would allow no discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f).
In this regard, the trial court abused its discretion. Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) affidavit spells
out clearly the discovery plaintiffs wished to pursue. Since Ms. Ramsay signed for the
notices of claim, plaintiffs should be allowed to discover exactly what she did with them.
The only remedy for the court at this point is to reverse the dismissal and remand the case
back to the district court in order for this discovery to ensue.
Finally, plaintiffs maintain that this court should take this opportunity to align
Utah's law with those state jurisdictions which require "substantial compliance" with
notice of claim requirements, instead of "strict compliance." Public policy stands in favor
of allowing citizens to bring claims against the government where the government has
acted in a tortious manner. Plaintiffs acknowledge that limitations must be set on the
public's abilities to bring claims, but the finality sought to be created by the notice of
claim requirements can be fulfilled by requiring strict compliance with the timing
provisions of a notice of claim, but allowing for substantial compliance as to the form of
the notice and its delivery.
The trial court erroneously concluded as a matter of law that the notice of claim
was defective. Therefore, this court must reverse.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS FULFILLED THE PURPOSE OF THE NOTICE OF CLAIM
REQUIREMENTS; DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM RAISING
THE NOTICE OF CLAIM ISSUE

8

Plaintiffs delivery of the notice was legally sufficient. The facts and
circumstances of this case indicate that defendant should be estopped from asserting the
failure to file the notice of claim with the county clerk. The real claim of the defendants
is that the claim was not directed to the County Clerk. The record indicates that the
notices were in fact received in the County Clerk's office by an employee of the County
Clerk. There is no question but that the notice of claim was received by those with
exercising function of adjusting and litigating claims against Kane County. Moreover,
under the actual or apparent authority of his position as Kane County attorney, Carl
Winchester expressly directed the plaintiffs to direct all further communication and
correspondence to an attorney who had been hired by the county's insurer. This all
inclusive statement would encompass any notice of claim. Thus, the continuing activities
of the defendants in the following many months prior to the expiration of time for the
notice of claim to be filed, and the information forwarded, clearly constituted a proper
notice of claim. Even if such did not constitute as proper notice, the activities and
representation of Mr. Winchester lead to the conclusion that defendants should be
estopped from asserting the notice of claim requirements as being fatal to plaintiffs
claims.
Utah appellate courts have explained that interpreting the notice of requirements
the Utah governmental immunity act they will do so in a manner consistent with the
overall purpose of the act itself. Brittian v. State by and through Utah Department of

9

Employment, 882 P.2d 666, 670 (Utah App. 1994). This court recently explained that a
notice of claim provides the entity sued with the factual details of the incident and
provides the governmental entity "an opportunity to correct the condition that caused the
injury, and perhaps settle the matter without the expense of litigation." Rushton v. Salt
Lake County. 1999 UT 36,1} 20, 977 P.2d 1201 (quoting Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp..
955 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1998).
As explained by the Utah Supreme court, "[I]t is necessary to consider the
policy of the notice requirement so that in any particular case the facts may
be evaluated to determine that the intent of the statute has been
accomplished."

Brittian. 882 P.2d 666, 670.
The Brittian court, citing the Utah Supreme Court, explained the purpose of the
notice of claim requirement.
[T]he primary purpose of the notice claim requirement is to afford the
responsible public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely
investigation of the merits of a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement if
appropriate thereby appointing the expenditure of public revenue for costly
and unnecessary litigation.
Brittian, 882P.2d at 671. In finding that the plaintiff in Brittian had fulfilled the notice of
claim requirements by filing a notice of claim with the division of risk management,3
which agency had the responsibility to adjust the claim, the court concluded:
Considering the duties delegated to Risk Management, it appears the state entity

3

Brittian was decided under a predecessor statute.
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entrusted with investigating and settling or defending the claim received the
requisite notice in a timely manner and well within the one year period imposed by
the statute. Filing notice with Risk Management in no way inhibited the possibility
of settling the claim without resort of litigation. In fact, given the powers and
responsibility the legislature has bestowed upon risk management, the opposite is
true. Filing notice with Risk Management facilitated settlement discussion by
providing notice to the agency responsible for investigating and settling the
claim.... Indeed, the record indicates that Risk Management activity pursued
settling Brittian's claim.
In the present matter, the exact same factual scenario is presented. The letters by Mr.
Winchester and Ms. Hutton point out that Ms. Hutton was delegated the duty of
investigating or settling or defending the claim which had been received by virtue of the
notice of claim filed with the county commissioners. Filing the notice with the county
commissioners has in no way inhibited the possibility of settling the claim without resort
to litigation. Instead, Ms. Hutton attempted to verify the claim by the submission of the
consent to the release of medical records. All of the activities occurred in the months
before the notice was due. Thus, the agents for Kane County actively pursued
investigating and settling this claim.
The holding ofBrittain obtains here. As the plaintiff in Brittian had timely filed
the notice of claim, the Brittain court only required substantial compliance with the
statute as to the notice's delivery. Such substantial compliance meets all of the goals of
the Governmental Immunity Act. The correct entity had an opportunity to investigate the
claim. That entity could thereafter adjust and settle the claim.
The case of Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority. 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980) buttresses

11

the position that the notice of claim in this matter was satisfactory. In StahL the plaintiff
was rear ended by a UTA bus. The same day as a the accident, plaintiff was contacted by
the insurance adjuster for the insurance carrier for UTA.
He obtained a statement from her concerning the accident and wrote a two
page report based on her answers to his inquiries. Vance also had Plaintiff
sign a statement and medical information release allowing her physical
physician to disclose information to him.
StahL, 618 P.2d at 480. Based upon this statement alone and the medical releases, the
Utah Supreme court held that a proper notice of claim had been made.
When the plaintiff in Stahl brought the lawsuit against UTA, UTA argued that the
plaintiff had not brought her claim within the then applicable 30 day period. However,
the Utah Supreme Court in Stahl found that: "There was substantial compliance with the
30 day notice provision and defendant was in no way prejudiced by plaintiffs failure to
comply with the formality of filing a claim." Id at 42. So holding, the Stahl court found
the insurance agent was authorized by law to handle the approval and denial of plaintiff s
claims, thus representing the interests of the government. The court found that the
insurance adjuster's actions in obtaining a signed statement of the plaintiffs version of
the accident were for all practical purposes the acts of the UTA. Under these facts, the
Utah Supreme court held: "Clearly there was substantial compliance with the notice of
claim provision. No undue hardship resulted from the notice being given to and agent of

12

the party named in the statute." Id.4
With approval, the Stahl court reviewed the Pennsylvania case of Badger v. Upper
Darby Township, 348 Pa. 551, 36 A.2d 507 (1944) where plaintiffs counsel, within the
prescribed period, gave written notice to the insurance carrier for the defendant Township
rather than the clerk or secretary of such municipality, as required by statute. In allowing
the plaintiff to maintain the action even in light of this failure, the Badger court held:
In determining, in its discretion, whether a failure to file a notice prescribed
by the act should be excused, a weighty circumstance could be considered
by the court as whether or not the municipality has suffered any undue
hardship. Here there is nothing to indicate that it did so suffer. Of
controlling importance is the fact that within the prescribed period the
insurance company was notified that the claim was being made, was
furnished with the essential facts regarding the accident, and, by designating
a physician to examine the plaintiff apparently admitted its responsibilities
to investigate the claim. If, as would appear, the insurance the company is
the real party in interest a decision denying plaintiff the right to prosecute a
claim because of failure to give written notice to the township would be one
of sure literalism, for had such notice been given, the township would
undoubtably, in due course, have turned it over to the company to which
plaintiffs counsel had sent it in the first instance. It is no unusual for
lawyers representing claimants in accident cases to communicate with
insurance companies directly rather than with defendants, since the former
control negotiations for settlement and prepared the defense in case of
litigation.
Id at 508-09.
In the present circumstances the applicability of this reasoning is even more plain.

4

Plaintiff recognizes that the Stahl court attempted to distinguish the Transit Act
from the Governmental Immunity Act at issue here. However, plaintiff maintains that the
distinction does not survive scrutiny and that the underlying holding of the Stahl court
obtains here.
13

The governmental entity in the present circumstances has not claimed any undue
hardship. In fact, the record is clear that the claim in this matter was made months before
the notice of claim was even required. The lawsuit was filed on the one year anniversary
of the accident date. Clearly, Ms. Hutton, representing Kane County and its insurer,
admitted her responsibility to investigate the claim by the letter of March 8, 1999. Even
more importantly, the Kane County attorney by his letter of March 20, 1999 indicated that
"All further communication and correspondence" should be referred to Ms. Hutton. In
other words, from that point on, the county had designated Ms. Hutton for the receipt of
any notice whatsoever. It would be an inequitable conclusion and unjust for this court to
hold that plaintiffs could not rely on the county attorney himself or other representatives
of the county.
The case ofBischel v. Merit 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995) leads to a similar
conclusion. In Bischel a plaintiff was uncertain where a notice of claim should be filed.
The plaintiff called the county offices and was told to send the notice to a specific
attorney at the county attorney's office. The plaintiff then called the county attorney to
confirm the instruction. The notice was sent by certified mail to the county attorney.
However, when the action was brought, the county moved to dismiss the case based on
the single fact that the notice was addressed to the county attorney instead of the county
commission.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court and found the notice of claim to the

14

county attorney was valid. The court of appeals based its decision, in large part, on the
significant fact that the county attorney verified her apparent authority to receive the
notice on behalf of the county commission. Bischel 902 P.2d at 278. Plaintiffs ask this
court to affirm the reasoning ofBischel and apply that reasoning herein. In the present
action, with the clear authority of Kane County, Kane County's attorney, Mr. Winchester
directed that all further communications and correspondence should be made to Ms.
Hutton. Ms. Hutton had already acknowledged the receipt of the notice of claim.
Accordingly, plaintiffs knew that the notice of claim was already in possession of that
person who should have the notice of claim according to the county attorney Mr.
Winchester.
The notice provided by plaintiffs in the present action gave Kane County ample
opportunity to investigate and negotiate the claims. The Bischel court concluded in that
case: "Bischel thus fulfilled the purpose of the notice requirement by filing the notice of
her claim with the designated person in the county attorneys office." Id 278. In the
present circumstances, plaintiffs have fulfilled the notice requirements by filing the notice
with the county commissioners and by further following the instructions of the Kane
County attorney that all further communication and correspondence be referred to Mr.
Hutton.
The Bischel court concluded:
Considering the duties and authority delegated to the County Attorney's
Office, it is evident that the governmental entity entrusted with
15

investigating and settling or defending the claim received the requisite
notice well within the one year period imposed by the statute. Directing and
delivering her notice of claim to the County Attorney's Office in no way
inhibited settling Bischel's claim without resort of litigation. In fact, given
the powers and responsibilities the County has bestowed upon the County
Attorney's Office, the opposite is true. See Id at 672. Filing notice with the
County Attorney's Office facilitated settlement discussion. Indeed, the
County Attorney's Office actively pursued settlement of Bischel's claim,
even paying her property damage.
Id at 278-79. Likewise, in the present circumstances, directing the notice to the county
commissioners in no way inhibited the settlement of plaintiffs' claim without resort to
litigation. The county attorney turned the entire matter over to its insurance company,
which in turn turned it over to its current attorneys months before any notice of claim was
required. Those attorneys followed up on receiving supplemental information regarding
the claim. In the final analysis, once the Kane County attorney directed that all further
communication and correspondence go through Ms. Hutton, no further claims or notice
were required.
Applying estoppel in a notice of claim situation is not new to this court. In Rice v.
Granite School Dist. 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969) this court held that a
school district was estopped to assert a statute of limitations where a claimant had been
induced to non-action by the representations of an adjuster of the school district's insurer.
This court held that a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment existed as to
the application of the facts to the issue of estoppel. Accordingly, the matter was
remanded to the trial court.

16

Again, in the present matter, plaintiffs reasonably relied upon the representation of
the Kane County Attorney as to the person who needed to possess the notice of claim, Ms.
Hutton. As stated, Ms. Hutton had already confirmed her possession of that same notice
of claim.
Accordingly, the trial court erroneously concluded that plaintiff had failed to fulfill
the purpose of the notice of claim requirements.
The County Attorney had the authority, real or apparent, to confirm the
person to possess and act upon the notice of claim. The Kane County attorney had
authority to direct plaintiffs to direct all communication to Ms. Hutton. Once again, the
case of Bischel v. Merritt 907 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1995) is instructive. In Bischel, the
plaintiff sent a notice of claim to the County Attorney's Office as instructed by the
County Attorney's Office. In deciding the notice of claim was sufficient under those
circumstances, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: "Considering the duties and authority
delegated to the county attorney's office, it is evident that the governmental entity
entrusted with investigating and settling or defending the claim received the requisite
notice well within the one year period imposed by the statue." Id. at 278. The Court of
Appeals noted that in Bischel the court was not faced with a case where the plaintiff had
given no notice, or where the notice of claim was defective in its form or content, or
where the notice had not been filed within one year. The Bischel court concluded: "It
appears at best disigenuous for the county to argue that Bishel's notice was inadequate
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merely because she directed and delivered it at the county commission and the county
attorney's office as instructed. The public deserves more consistent, more credible
treatment from its servants."
This holding is in concert with this court's recent ruling in Salt Lake County
Commission v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 1999 UT 73, ffl 17 and 19, 985 P.2d 899
where this court unequivically stated that the county attorney represents the entity of the
county. The county attorney acts as the attorney for the county. This conclusion finds
support in Utah's statutes. Whether a county attorney acts in a prosecution district or in a
county which is not in a prosecution district, a county attorney is charged to "defend all
actions brought against the county." See Utah Code Ann. § 17-18-1 (7)(a)( 1995) and §1718-1.5(5)(a)(1997). Further, Utah Code Ann. §17-18-2 (1993) provides: "The county
attorney is the legal adviser of the county. He must attend meetings of the county
legislative body when required, and must oppose all claims and accounts against the
county when he deems them unjust or illegal." Thus, the Kane County Attorney, Mr.
Winchester, clearly had the statutory authority to direct plaintiffs that all communications
and correspondence should go to Ms. Hutton.
Even if the county attorney did not have statutory authority, his apparent authority
was clear. The position of the county attorney creates an appearance which would direct
any person to reasonably believe that the county attorney had authority to act on the
county's behalf. Therefore, although actual authority is self-apparent in the present
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matter, in any event the county attorney had apparent authority for his direction. See
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 762 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah 1988); Walker
Bank & Trust Co. v. Jones, 672 P.2d 73,75 (Utah 1983). Accordingly, plaintiffs acted
reasonably and in reliance upon the county attorney when faced with facts and
circumstances where the county attorney had directed all communication and
correspondence be sent to Ms. Hutton and Ms. Hutton had already confirmed to plaintiffs
that she possessed the actual notice of claim itself As a result, the trial court should have
concluded that the notice of claim was proper. Therefore, the trial court must be reversed.

II.
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED
PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(f).
It is universally held that when matters outside the pleadings under Rule 12 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are considered, the motion is properly treated as one for
summary judgment under rule 56. Thavne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah
1994); Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983). In fact, in Shunk v. State, 924 P.2d
879 (Utah 1996) this court reviewed a governmental immunity case where matters were
examined outside the pleadings and therefore the motion was decided under Rule 56.
Defendants' motion to dismiss in the present circumstances was supported by an
affidavit, as was plaintiffs' opposition. Accordingly, the trial court of necessity
considered matters outside the pleadings. As a result, the present motion is one which
was considered under rule 56. Pursuant to rule 56(f) plaintiffs filed an affidavit seeking
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further discovery which was denied by the trial court. Plaintiffs should be allowed
additional discovery to investigate the full extent of Kane County's receipt of the notice
of claim. While the affidavit of Holly Ramsey does state that neither Mary Wheeler nor
Petra Srbova filed notices of claim with the Kane County Clerk on or before September
27, 1999, the affidavit does not set forth that the County Clerk did not in fact receive the
notice by some other means. Discovery on this issue should be allowed. As such,
plaintiffs wish to obtain a full and complete claim file held by defendants in this matter,
including all correspondence between Kane County and their attorneys. Plaintiffs need
to see any documentation or reports generated by Kane County, or its insurer. Most
importantly, plaintiffs wish to depose Ms. Ramsay.
Therefore, based upon the rule 56(f) affidavit previously filed, the motion to
dismiss should not have been granted, but discovery should have been allowed to
proceed. The only remedy for this court at this point is to reverse the dismissal and
remand the case back to the district court for this discovery to ensue.
III. ONLY SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE SHOULD BE REQUIRED AS TO
THE DELIVERY OF A NOTICE OF CLAIM,
Judge Orme of the Utah Court of Appeals recently noted:
Significantly, the rule requiring "strict compliance" with the notice
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act does not come from the
language of the act itself. See Utah Code Annotated Sections 63-30-1 to 38
(1997 and Supp. 2000). Instead, the "strict compliance" standard was first
applied to Utah's Governmental Immunity Act by the Utah Supreme Court
in Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975).
This shift in Moreno from a blanket "strict compliance" standard for
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notices of claim to more of a "substantial compliance" standard, at least in
certain situations, is fully consistent with the more charitable view taken in
many other jurisdictions, which require only substantial compliance with
the state's governmental immunity statute. See, e.g. Brasher v. City of
Burmingham. 341 So.2d 137, 138 (Ala. 1976): Woodsmall v. Regional
Trans. Dist. 800 P.2d 63,69 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); Washington v. City of
Columbus, 222 S.E.2d. 583, 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Vermeer v. Snellen
190 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Iowa 1971); Carr v. Town of Shubuta. 733 So.2d
261,263 (Miss. 1999).
Great West Cas. v. Utah Dept. of Trans.. 2001 UT App 54, % 15 note 6, 415 Utah Adv.
Rep. 26. In Moreno, this court found a notice of claim "legally sufficient" where a
guardian of a child "mistakenly assumed" they would be the beneficiaries of a wrongful
death action regarding a minor decedent. This court allowed the notice of claim where
plaintiff acted upon advice of counsel and "in good faith." Moreno v. Board of Educ. of
Jordan School Dist., 926 P.2d 886, 892 (Utah 1996). A copy of the Moreno decision is
attached hereto in Appendix B.
As Judge Orme recognized, the strict compliance requirement is a creation of this
court. Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30-11(2) provides:
Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against its employee for an act or ommission occurring during the
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, shall file a written notice with the entity before
maintaining an action, regardless whether or not the function giving rise to
the claims is governmental.
(emphasis added). Thus, the heart and soul of the Governmental Immunity Act's
governmental notice of claim requirements is that a notice of claim be filed with the
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entity.5 In the present circumstances, there is no question but that the notice of claim was
filed with the entity. The present dispute arises in the next subsection which requires:
The notice shall be:
(ii) directed and delivered to:
(B) the county clerk when the claim is against the county [.]
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(B)(1998).
In the present circumstances, the notice of claim requirement has been fulfilled
because the entity received the notices and it had been delivered to that person the county
designated as the direct repository for notice of claims for this claim. However, this court
should take this opportunity to modify its standard as to notices of claim to a "substantial
compliance" standard instead of "strict compliance" so far as form of the notice and its
delivery are concerned. As long as the purpose and intent of subsection (2) of § 63-30-11
is met, that is, the entity has received the claim, the notice of claim should be found
effective if it otherwise substantially meets the notice requirements and is timely.
In fact, long ago this court essentially applied the substantial compliance standard

5

Before the trial court below defendants cited the court to Bellonio v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 911 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1996). A copy of Bellonio is attached in Appendix
B. Bellonio upheld the dismissal of a claim where a notice of claim had been presented to
the wrong entity. This court characterized the holding of Bellonio as: "dismissing action
by pedestrian injured in airport parking terrace for failure to serve governing body of
city." Thus, Bellonio's facts are readily distinguishable from the present case. Here, the
correct entity received the notice, acknowledged that receipt, and gave direction
concerning the notice.
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to a notice of claim issue in Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 412 P.2d 449
(1966). A copy is attached hereto in Appendix B. In Spencer, a plaintiff had fallen on an
allegedly defective sidewalk. At that time, Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-77 (1953) required a
person to file a claim within 30 days of the injury. Although the claim was filed within
30 days, the trial court dismissed the action because the notice did not state the amount of
damages claimed. The Spencer court noted:
There is a wide difference between presenting no claim at all and presenting
one of the kind shown here which evidently fulfills the main purpose of the
statute: of giving the City the essential facts as soon as reasonably possible
after the injury so that it will have ample opportunity to make a proper
investigation.
Id. at 450. The Spencer court then held:
Inasmuch as the plaintiff filed the claim within the 30 days allowed by
statute, the claim was sufficient to constitute substantial compliance with
the statute and apprize the City of the essentials thereof, it is our opinion
that the dismissal was in error.
Id. (emphasis added). This court should reaffirm this holding and clarify that
jurisdictional a trial court cannot entertain an action against a governmental entity
where no notice of claim was filed or where the notice is simply untimely. However,
where a notice is timely submitted, the notice of claim should suffice if the claimant
substantially complies with the form and delivery requirements of the statute. Such a
conclusion would be in concert with the reality of the modern relationship between the
government and its citizens.
As Judge Orme noted:
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Aside from the niceties of prior case law adopting and reiterating a ''strict
compliance" standard found nowhere in the governing statute, if a
technically deficient notice of claim nonetheless does what such a notice is
designed to do and provides the State with enough information to become
aware of the incident, conduct an investigation, and make an informed
decision about its liability, the State should not be so quick to hide behind
the cloak of "sovereign immunity." That doctrine arose when the monarch
was rather antagonistic to his subjects and wished to insulate the treasury
from the just claims of the peasantry, who were expected to embrace the
fiction that "the King can do no wrong." We know better now, and in
modern America, where the state enjoys a much more benevolent
relationship with its citizens and has a more realistic view of its own
fallibility, the enlightened sovereign should be willing to accept
responsibility for its negligence when the deficiencies in a notice of claim
do not actually prejudice its ability to investigate a claim, evaluate its merit,
and resolve it in timely fashion. Such an adjustment in the philosophy
underlying our State's sovereign immunity scheme must, however, come at
the hands of the legislature and not this court.
Great West Casualty v. Utah Department of Transportation. 2001 UT App 54, ^ 18,415
Utah Adv. Rep. 26. While Judge Orme's sentiments concerning the realities of a strict
compliance standard are accurate, an adjustment of the philosophy should come from this
court. The Utah Court of Appeals was compelled to follow this court's established rule
of strict compliance. However, where the genesis of the strict compliance rule is found in
this court's jurisprudence, and not in the statute at issue, this court should review the
application of the strict compliance standard.
Public policy stands in favor of allowing citizens to bring claims against the
government where the government has acted in a tortious manner. Plaintiffs
acknowledge that limitations must be set on the public's abilities to bring claims, but the
finality sought to be created by the notice of claim requirements can be fulfilled by
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requiring strict compliance with the timing provisions of a notice of claim, but allowing
for substantial compliance as to the form of the notice and its delivery.
When this court imposed its strict compliance requirement upon the statutory
notice of claim rubric, the court's action was not without dissent. Scarborough v. Granite
School District 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975)(Justice Maughan dissenting)6; Varoz v. Sevev,
29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973)(Justice Ellett dissenting); Gallegos v. Midvale City.
27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972)(Justice Ellett dissenting).
This court should review its position as to strict compliance and allow for justice.
As the legislature directed in Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (1953):
The rule of common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly
construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate,
and their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally
construed with the view to effect the objects of the statutes and promote
justice. Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the
rules of common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity
shall prevail.
Justice Maughan invoked this section when he noted:
In view of the fact that our statutes are to be liberally construed to effect
their objectives and to promote justice, I would not extend, by implication,
the terms of 63-30-13, particularly where it is invoked by a political

6

In Scarborough, Justice Maughan stated: "The instant matter sparks recollection
of the instructions given by the Khalif Omar, to his first Kadi c. 900 A.D.: 'If thou seest
fit to judge differently from yesterday, do not hesitate to follow the truth as thou seest it;
for truth is eternal and it is better to return to the true than persist in the false.'"
Scarborough, 531 P.2d at 483, note 5. (Please note if using Westlaw electronic services
that the Westlaw transcriber left out the paragraph to which this footnote is ascribed).
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subdivision to avoid liability.
Scarborough. 531 P.2d at 483.
Since this court did in fact impose the strict compliance standard by implication,
this court should review this position and align its conclusion to promote justice and
equity. Citizens with colorable claims against the state government should be able to
proceed if they have substantially complied with the notice of claim provisions in a timely
manner. The weight of equity can be balanced by requiring that a notice be filed and that
the notice is timely. However, this court should allow for substantial compliance as to the
form of the notice and its delivery. Since plaintiffs did in fact substantially comply with
the statute by timely filing a notice of claim, the trial court should be reversed and this
matter remanded for trial.

CONCLUSION
Because Kane County, the entity concerned, received the notice of claim, and more
particularly, because the person whom the county attorney designated as the proper
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recipient for the notice of claim did in fact possess the notice of claim, the trial court's
decision to dismiss the matter must be reversed. Further, for the other reasons outlined in
plaintiffs' brief, the trial court's conclusion must be reversed and the matter remanded for
trial.
DATED AND SIGNED this 16th day of March, 2001.

R. PHIL IVIE
DAVID N. MORTENSEN
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/Appellants
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ADDENDUM A

UT Code § 63-30-11, Claim for
injury—Notice—Contents—Service—Legal disability.

Utah Code §63-30-11
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN
GENERAL
CHAPTER 30.
GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT
Current through End of 2000 General
Sess

§ 63-30-11. Claim for injury—NoticeContents—Service—Legal disability.
< Text of section effective until
July 1,2001 >
(1) A claim arises when the statute of
limitations that would apply if the claim were
against a pnv ate person begins to run
(2) Any person ha\mg a claim for injury
agamst a go\ernmental entity, or agamst its
employee for an act or omission occurring during
the performance of the employee's duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority shall file a written notice of claim with
the entity before maintaining an action, regardless
of whether or not the function giving nse to the
claim is characterized as governmental
(3)(a) The notice of claim shall set forth

Page 1

(u) directed and delrvered to
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is
agamst an incorporated city or town,
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is agamst
a county,
(C)
the
superintendent
or
business
administrator of the board, when the claim is
agamst a school district or board of education,
(D) the president or secretan of the board,
when the claim is agamst a special district,
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is
agamst the State of Utah, or
(F) a member of the governing board, the
executive director, or executive secretary, when
the claim is against any other public board,
commission, or bodv
(4)(a) If the claimant is under the age of
majority, or mentally incompetent and without a
legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the
claimant may apply to the court to extend the tune
for service of notice of claim
(b)(i) After hearing and notice to the
governmental entity, the court may extend the
time for service of notice of claim
(n) The court may not grant an extension that
exceeds the applicable statute of limitations

(I) a brief statement of the facts,
(n) the nature of the claim asserted, and
(in) the damages incurred by the claimant so far
as they are known
(b) The notice of claim shall be
(I) signed by the person making the claim or
that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal
guardian, and

*21751 (c) In determining whether or not to
grant an extension, the court shall consider
whether the delay m serving the notice of claim
will substantially prejudice the governmental
entity m maintaining its defense on the merits
Amended b\ Laws 1991 c 76 Laws 1998 c 164, § 1, eff
May 4, 1998

< For text of section effective
July 1, 2001, see § 63-30-11, post >
Search this disc for cases citmg this section

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No

laim to original U.S. Govt, works

UT Code § 63-30-13, Claim against political subdivision or its
employee—Time for filing notice.
Utah Code § 63-30-13

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS
IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30.
GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT
(Information regarding effective
dates, repeals, etc. is provided
subsequently in this document.)
Current through End of 2000 General
Sess.

§

63-30-13. Claim against political
subdivision or its employee—Time for
filing notice.

A claim against a political subdivision, or
against its employee for an act or omission

Page 1

occurring during the performance of the
employee's duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred
unless notice of claim is filed with the governing
body of the political subdivision according to the
requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of
any extension of time granted under Section
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized
as governmental.
Amended by Laws 1987, c. 75; Laws 1998, c. 164, § 3, eff
May 4, 1998.

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN
GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT
Search this disc for cases citing this section.

Copyright (c) West Group 2000 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

ADDENDUM B
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977 P.2d 1201. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, (Utah 1999)
"12(11 977 P.2d 1201
367 Utah Adv. Rep. 26.1999 UT 36
Supreme Court of Utah.
Owen RUSHTON, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political subdivision of
the State of
Utah, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 980039.
April 16, 1999.
Property owner filed action against county seeking
return of excess land mistakenly conveyed to county in
condemnation proceedings. The Third District, Salt
Lake County, Glenn K. Iwasaki, J., dismissed property
owner's claim, and property owner appealed. The
Supreme Court, Russon, J., held that: (1) property
owner did not meet written notice of claim
requirements of immunity statute, and (2) property
owner's action was barred by statute of limitations.
Affirmed.
Howe, C.J., concurred in the result and filed an
opinion.
Stewart, J., dissented.

[3] Municipal Corporations ®=>741 40( 1)
268 —
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in
General
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims
for Injury
268k741.40 Excuses for and Relief from
Delay or Failure
268k741.40(1) In General.
Actual notice does not cure a party's failure to meet
the notice of claim requirements of the Governmental
Irnmunity Act. U.C.A.1953,63-30-1 l(3)(a).
[4] Municipal Corporations <©=>741.15
268 —
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in
General
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims
for Injury
268k741.15 Necessity and Purpose.
A notice of claim pursuant to the Governmental
Immunity Act provides the governmental entity an
opportunity to correct the condition that caused the
injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the matter
without the expense of litigation.
U.C.A.1953,
63-30-1 l(3)(a).

West Headnotes
[1] Statutes <3==> 176
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl76 Judicial Authority and Duty.
The proper interpretation of a statute is a question
of law.
[2] Municipal Corporations <®=^741.20
268 —
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in
General
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims
for Injury
268k741.20 Requirement as Mandatory or
Condition Precedent.
Failure to file a written notice of claim against a
governmental entity for an injury deprives the court of
subject matter jurisdiction. U.C.A. 1953,63-30-11 (2).

[5] Counties @^>212
104 —
104X11 Actions
104k211 Conditions Precedent
104k212 Notice or Demand.
Letters hand-delivered by property owner's wife to
county board of commissioners did not meet written
notice of claim requirements of Governmental
Immunity Act in action seeking return of excess land
mistakenly conveyed to county in condemnation
proceedings, where letters simply requested county's
assistance in settling dispute so that property' owner
could develop property and did not alert board to
impeding legal action or mention property owner's
intention to seek a judicial remedy. U.C.A.1953,
63-30-1 l(3)(a).
[6] Limitation of Actions <©^66( 14)
241 —
24 III Computation of Period of Limitation
24111(B) Performance of Condition, Demand,
and Notice
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241k66 Demand
241k66(14) Property Wrongfully Received
or Held.
Even if property- owner filed a valid notice of claim
against county seeking return of excess land mistakenly
conveyed to county in condemnation proceedings,
action based on the claim was required to be filed
within one year after claim was denied or deemed
denied. U.CA.1953,63-30-14,63-30-15.
Carvel R. Shaffer, Bountiful, for plaintiff.
Douglas R. Short, Paul G. Maughan, Salt Lake
City, for defendant.
RUSSON, Justice:
% 1 Plaintiff Owen Rushton appeals the district
court's order of dismissal in favor of defendant Salt
Lake County. The district court dismissed Rushton's
claim against Salt Lake County on the ground that
Rushton failed to comply with the notice requirements
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
If 2 In November of 1967, Salt Lake County (the
"County") filed an eminent domain action to condemn
several parcels of property' in order to widen 5400
South at its intersection with 4300 West. As part of
that action. County7 officials sought to condemn .53
acres of property owned by Owen Rushton.
If 3 In December of 1967, the court issued an order
of immediate occupancy for the property in question,
which gave the County7 the right to occupy and use the
property in *1202 the manner intended by the original
condemnation resolution.
f 4 In August of 1969, LaMar Duncan, a deputy
county attorney, visited the Rushtons' home and
requested that they execute a quitclaim deed. Rushton,
his first wife Carol, and his mother Annie conveyed the
requested property to the County by quitclaim deed on
August 29, 1969. (FN1) The quitclaim deed conveyed
1.02 acres of the Rushtons' property to the County, .49
acres more than that which had been condemned.
U 5 In September of 1969, the County, through its
Board of Commissioners (the "Board"), approved
payment to the Rushtons for the purchase of their land
and issued a "claim form" requesting payment for 1.02
acres of land at $3,500 per acre, for a total of $3,573.
However, the claim form did not have a warrant
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number and was not signed by the County
Commissioners.
Rushton asserts that he never
received payment for any property7 conveyed by the
quitclaim deed.
% 6 The County used the Rushtons' land as
proposed—to widen the road at the intersection of 5400
South and 4300 West. The County did not, however,
use all of the land the Rushtons conveyed in the
quitclaim deed. For the next twenty-four years, the
Rushtons cared for the excess portion of property
conveyed to the County, which they believed to be
theirs. (FN2) During that time, neither the County7 nor
the Rushtons attempted to make use of the excess land.
% 7 In June of 1994, the Rushtons applied for a
conditional use jpermit to build a group dwelling on the
excess land.
The County denied the Rushtons'
application on the ground that the Rushtons had
conveyed that land to the County by quitclaim deed in
1969.
% 8 On September 14, 1994, Rushton's second wife
Myrna attended a Salt Lake County Commission
meeting. (FN3) She presented a letter addressed to the
Board expressing her concerns over the excess land the
Rushtons had conveyed to the County. The letter stated
the Rushtons' desire to develop the excess land and
their inability to do so because of the boundary dispute.
It also requested that the boundary be "corrected on the
county record .. to match the original court order,"
(FN4) which condemned only .53 acres. Myrna
contended there should be no charge for correcting the
deed and no further delay in obtaining the necessary
building permits to complete the proposed
development.
^ 9 In addition, the letter detailed the history of the
condemnation action and the quitclaim executed by the
Rushtons. The letter stated that neither Owen, Carol,
nor Annie realized the deed they signed conveyed more
property7 than originally condemned by the County.
Rather, they believed they had conveyed only .53 acres.
In her letter, Myrna wrote that there had never been a
marker or a fence to indicate the point where the
Rushtons' land ended and the County's began. Instead,
the Rushtons had used the curb and gutter constructed
by the County as the boundary between what they
believed to be their property and the land the County
used to widen the road. Myrna's letter reiterated the
Rushtons' claim that over the years they had maintained
land which, unbeknownst to them, was owned by the
County. Finally, the Rushtons asserted that the County
never paid them for the value of their land.
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\ 10 In response, the Board stated that the
quitclaim deed signed by the Rushtons and filed with
the County indicated that the County owned the land in
question. The Board suggested the Rushtons might be
able to purchase the excess land from the Count) to
proceed with their development and referred Myrna to
the Salt Lake County Real Estate Department.
*1203 H 11 On September 15, 1994, Myrna
presented a second letter addressed to then-Count}'
Commissioner Jim Bradley. In this letter, Myrna
objected to the Board's suggestion that the Rushtons
simply buy back the excess land from the County. She
reiterated Rushton's claim that had he known of the
inclusion of the excess land in the quitclaim deed, he
would not have signed the deed. The letter also
restated the Rushtons' claim that they were never paid
for the value of the land condemned by the County. In
closing, Myrna wrote. "With this further information in
your hands, I ask that you reconsider and agree to a
corrected QCD [quitclaim deed] on this property."
^ 12 Neither of the letters expressed an intent to file
suit against the County or to resort to legal action if the
matter was not resolved. Furthermore, while the
names of Myrna and Owen were typed at the end of the
letters, neither letter was signed.
K 13 On March 13, 1996, approximately eighteen
months after Myrna addressed the Board, Rushton filed
an action in Third District Court, seeking a writ of
mandamus ordering the County to convey the excess
acreage to him. Rushton claimed he signed the
quitclaim deed only because he believed the property
had been condemned by an order of the court. He
contended that, but for that belief, he would not have
executed the deed that incorporated not only the
original parcel of land the County condemned but also
the excess acreage. Moreover, Rushton claimed he
was never paid for either the original parcel of land or
the excess acreage.
1 14 The County moved to dismiss the action,
claiming that Rushton failed to file a notice of claim
with the County, as required by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act (the "Immunity Act"), and that
Rushton's action was barred by the statute of
limitations. On December 22, 1997, the trial court
granted the County's motion and dismissed Rushton's
complaint on the ground that he failed to comply with
the notice provisions of the Immunity Act.
If 15 On appeal, Rushton argues that the letters
presented to the Board met the statutory requirements

of notice prior to filing suit and that, therefore, the
district court erred in granting the County's motion to
dismiss. In response, the County argues that the notice
requirements of the Immunity Act require strict
compliance and that Rushton's letters did not meet the
mandatory requirements of the Act. The County
argues that even if we were to deem the Rushtons'
letters to be sufficient notice of their claim against the
County, Rushton's action would be barred because he
did not file his action within the time frame specified
by the Immunity Act. Furthermore, the County argues
that Rushton's action for payment for the land he
conveyed to the County is time-barred.
% 16 The issue before this court is whether the
district court erred in granting the County's motion to
dismiss on the ground that Rushton failed to comply
with the notice provisions of the Immunity Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] lj 17 The proper interpretation of a statute is a
question of law. See Johnson v. Redevelopment
Agency, 913 P.2d 723, 727 (Utah 1995). Therefore,
when reviewing an order of dismissal involving the
interpretation of a statute, we accord no deference to
the legal conclusions of the district court but review
them for correctness. See id.
ANALYSIS
[2] U 18 To bring suit against a governmental entity
for an injury, a party must file a written notice of claim
with that entity. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2)
(Supp.1998). Failure to file such notice deprives the
court of subject matter jurisdiction. See Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988).
[3] If 19 A notice of claim must include "(i) a brief
statement of the facts; (ii) the nature of the claim
asserted; and (iii) the damages incurred by the
claimant so far as they are known." Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-1 l(3)(a). We have consistently required strict
compliance with the requirements of the Immunity Act.
Actual notice does not cure a party's failure to meet
these requirements. See, e.g., Larson v. Park City
Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1998); Shunk v.
State, 924 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1996);
H204.
Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990);
Yates v. Vernal Family Health Ctr, 617 P.2d 352. 354
(Utah 1980); Scarborough v. Granite Sch. Dist., 531
P.2d 480,482 (Utah 1975).
[4] T 20 A notice of claim provides the entity being
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sued with the factual details of the incident that led to
the plaintiffs claim. Moreover, it "provide[s] the
governmental entity an opportunity to correct the
condition that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and
perhaps settle the matter without the expense of
litigation." Larson, 955 P.2d at 345-46.
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% 23 We Jiffirm the district court's dismissal of
Rushton's complaint against the County.
f 24 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM and Justice
ZIMMERMAN concur in Justice RUSSOWs opinion.
HOWE, Chief Justice, concurring in the result:

[5] If 21 Rushton asserts he filed sufficient notice of
his claim against the County in the form of the letters
Myrna hand-delivered to the Board on September 14
and 15 of 1994. We disagree. A review of the letters
reveals that neither letter sufficiently set forth the
nature of the claim asserted for statutory purposes.
While the letters set forth the facts surrounding the
boundary dispute, neither letter was presented to the
Board as a notice of claim. Furthermore, they were not
worded so as to alert the Board or the County to any
impending legal action. In fact, there was no mention
of the Rushtons' intention to seek any judicial remedy.
Rather, the letters simply requested the County's
assistance in settling the boundary dispute so the
Rushtons could proceed with the development of their
property. Such a request is not sufficient to state the
nature of the claim asserted or to put the County on
notice that a claim is being asserted against it.
Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing
Rushton's complaint against the County for failure to
comply with the notice requirements of the Immunity
Act. (FN5)
[6] \ 22 Furthermore, Rushton's action fails
because he did not file it within the time period
prescribed in Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-14 & -15.
After a valid notice of claim is filed, the governmental
entity or its insurance carrier has ninety days in which
to approve or deny the claim. See Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-14. If at the end of the ninety days the claim has
not been approved or denied, it is deemed to be denied.
See id. Once the claim is denied, a party has one year
in which to initiate an action. See id. § 63-30-15. In
the present case, Rushton argues he filed a valid notice
of claim in September of 1994. However, Rushton did
not file his action until March 13, 1996. one and a half
years later. Therefore, even assuming there was a valid
notice of claim, Rushton did not file his action within
one year after the claim was either denied or deemed to
be denied. Therefore, his action must fail.
CONCLUSION

f 25 I concur in the result. I write to point out that
in his complaint, Rushton sought both money damages
and an order ithat the County reconvey to him the
property described in the quitclaim deed in excess of
the .53 acres that he claims he intended to convey and
that the County intended to buy. To the extent that his
suit constituted an equitable claim against the County,
it would not be subject to the Immunity Act. Bennett v.
Bow Valley Dev. Corp., 797 P.2d 419, 422 (Utah
1990). However, Rushton did not argue that he had an
equitable claim either in the district court or in his brief
on appeal. He apparently first made that assertion in
his oral argument before this court. That came too late
since the County had no opportunity to respond.
126 Justice STEWART dissents.
(FN1.) Rushton's quitclaim deed was recorded with
the Salt Lake County Recorder on May 20, 1970.
(FN2.) The County made several requests to the
Rushtons to keep the excess property free of weeds
and debris. On one occasion, when the Rushtons
failed to mountain the property to the County's
satisfaction, the County performed the work itself
and then billed the Rushtons for its efforts.
(FN3.) On June 9, 1993, Rushton appointed his wife
Myrna as his attorney-in-fact for purposes of
litigation. It was in this capacity that she addressed
the Board.
(FN4.) In referring to the "original court order,"
Myrna probably meant to refer to the condemnation
resolution of 1967.
*1204_ (FN5.) We also note that neither letter was
signed. Rather, the names of Myrna and Owen
were typed at the end of the letter. See Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b) (Supp.1998) ("The notice
of claim shall be: (i) signed by the person making
the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or
legal guardianf.]").
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30k842(2)

Questions Are of Law or
of Fact
Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

Supreme Court of Utah.
[See headnote text below]
Julie and Emilio MORENO, Plaintiffs and
Appellees,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE JORDAN
SCHOOL DISTRICT, Jordan
School District, and John Does I-X, Defendants
and
Appellees.
Laura Bartlett, individually and as representative
of the
heirs of Bill Bartlett, deceased, Intervenor and
Appellant
No. 950185.
Nov. 8, 1996.
After school district denied child's legal guardians*
notice of claim, which sought recovery for child's
drowning, guardians sued school district's Board of
Education for wrongful death. Child's mother moved
to intervene as party plaintiff. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J.,
denied Board's motion for summary judgment as
against guardians, and denied mother's motion to
intervene. Mother appealed. The Supreme Court
Russon, J., held that guardians could not maintain
wrongful death action on their own behalf, but only in
behalf of child's heirs. In separate opinion by Howe,
J., the court held that guardians' notice of claim was
legally sufficient to support mother's maintenance of
wrongful death action.

[1] Appeal and Error <©=* 1008.1(5)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact Verdicts, and
Findings
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court
30k 1008 Conclusiveness in General
30k 1008.1 In General
30k 1008.1 (5)
Clearly
Erroneous
Findings.
Supreme Court reviews trial court's legal
conclusions nondeferentially for correctness and its
factual determinations for clear error.
[2] Statutes @=^ 1XK
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k 187 Meaning of Language
361kl88 In General.
Statute is generally construed according to its plain
language.
[3] Statutes <©==> 189
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36 Ik 187 Meaning of Language
36 Ik 189
Literal
and
Grammatical
Interpretation.

Reversed and remanded.
[See headnote text below]
Zimmerman, C.J., concurred in opinion by Russon,
J.
Howe, J., filed separate opinion in which Stewart,
Associate C.J., and Durham, J., concurred.
West Headnotes
[1] Appeal and Error ®^842(2)
30 -—
30XVI Review
30XVT(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered .
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether

[3] Statutes @=*212.6
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36 lk212 Presumptions to Aid Construction
361k212.6 Words Used.
Court assumes that each term in statute was used
advisedly; thus, statutory words are read literally,
unless such reading is unreasonably confused or
inoperable.
[4] Statutes <§==> 184
361 —
361V1 Construction and Operation
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361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl80 Intention of Legislature
36 Ik 184 Policy and Purpose of Act.
[See headnote text below]
[4] Statutes @=>217.4
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction
361k217.4 Legislative History in General.
Only when court finds ambiguity in statute's plain
language must court seek guidance from legislative
history and relevant policy determinations.
[5] Statutes <®^ 183
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl80 Intention of Legislature
361kl83 Spirit or Letter of Law.
[See headnote text below]
[5] Statutes <@=^206
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361 V1(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k206 Giving Effect to Entire Statute.
[See headnote text below]
[5] Statutes <@=>208
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic
Aids to Construction
361k208 Context and Related Clauses.
One cardinal principle of statutory construction is
that courts will look to reason, spirit and sense of
legislation, as indicated by entire context and subject
matter of statute dealing with subject.
[6] Death ®=>32
117 —
117III Actions for Causing Death
117111(A) Right of Action and Defenses
117k32 Persons for Whose Benefit Suit May Be
Maintained.

Page 2

[See headnote text below]
[6] Guardian and Ward © ^ 1 1 8
196 —
196 V Actions
196kl 18 Rights of Action by Guanlian or Ward
or Both.
Statute that permits parents or guardian to maintain
action for wrongful death of child does not permit
guardian to maintain action in his own behalf, but only
in behalf of child's heirs. U.C.A.1953,78-11-6.
[7] Death <©^31(1)
117 —
117III Actions for Causing Death
117111(A) Right of Action and Defenses
117k31 Persons Entitled to Sue
117k31(1) In General.
[See headnote text below]
[7] Death <@=*32
117 —
117III Actions for Causing Death
117111(A) Right of Action and Defenses
117k32 Persons for Whose Benefit Suit May
Be Maintained.
[See headnote text below]
[7] Guardian and Ward <®^22
196 —
196II Appointment, Qualification, and Tenure of
Guardian
196k22 Death of Ward.
[See headnote text below]
[7] Guardian and Ward <@=^ 118
196 —
196 V Actions
196kl 18 Rights of Action by Guardian or Ward
or Both.
While rights and responsibilities of guardian
flowing out of legal custody of ward terminate upon
death of ward, guardian's ability to maintain action for
wrongful death of minor flows from guardian's residual
duty of accounting and does not terminate upon minor's
death; this obligation is not for personal benefit of
guardian, but is among guardian's residual duties upon
death of his ward, and therefore any wrongful death
action must be brought in behalf of ward's heirs.
U.C.A.1953,75-5-210,78-11-6.
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[8] Appeal and Error @=*854(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision of
Lower Court
30k854 Reasons for Decision
30k854(l) In General.
Supreme Court may affirm trial court's decision on
any ground.
[9] Schools <©=* 112
345 —
345II Public Schools
34511(1) Claims Against District
345kll2 Presentation and Allowance of
Claims.
Child's legal guardians' notice of claim to school
arising from child's death was sufficient to notify
school of child's mother's claim, thus enabling her to
maintain wrongful death action against school, even
though guardians' notice of claim sought to recover in
their own behalf and did not even mention mother;
notice of claim fulfilled purpose of Governmental
Immunity Act's notice of claim provision, as notice was
timely filed, set out facts and nature of claim, and
stated damages incurred by claimant "so far as they are
known." U.C.A.1953,63-30-1 l(3)(a).
P/C per Justice Howe's separate opinion
*887
plaintiffs.

Julian D. Jensen, Salt Lake City, for

Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Donald H. Hansen, Brent
A. Burnett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for school
district parties.
Richard I. Ashton, David A. Wilde, Murray, for
intervenor.
RUSSON, Justice:
Laura Bartlett appeals from the trial court's denial
of her motion to intervene in the action for wrongful
death of her minor son Bill Bartlett, brought by her
son's legal custodians and guardians, Julie and Emilio
Moreno, against the Board of Education of the Jordan
School District and the Jordan School District
(collectively, the School District). The trial court
denied Bartlett's motion to intervene on the ground that
the Morenos, not Bartlett, were the real party in
interest. The trial court further concluded that any
Copyright (c) West Group 2000

residual parental rights Bartlett had after losing custody
of her son terminated at her son's death. We reverse.
FACTS
Julie and Emilio Moreno provided foster care for
Bill Bartlett commencing approximately March 1983.
when he was five years old. In November 1991, by
order of the Third District Juvenile Court, the Morenos
were awarded permanent custody and guardianship of
Bill. However, the Morenos never adopted Bill, nor
were Bill's mother's parental rights terminated. Bill
resided with the Morenos for approximately nine years
until his death in June 1992 after drowning in the
swimming pool at West Jordan Middle School.
In December 1992. the Morenos filed a notice of
claim with the School District pursuant to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. §§
63-30-1 to -38, alleging that the negligence of the
School District and its employees proximately caused
Bill's death. Further, the Morenos claimed that as Bill's
legal and exclusive guardians, they were entitled to
bring an action and recover damages in their own
behalf for Bill's wrongful death pursuant to section
78-11-6 of the Utah Code. That section provides:
[A] parent or guardian may maintain an action for
the death or injury of a minor child when the injury
or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another.
The Morenos sought special medical damages in
the amount of $87,543.39, funeral and personal losses
of $10,000, and compensation for loss of love,
affection, comfort, and society in the amount of
$750,000. The notice of claim did not name—or even
mention—Bill's natural mother, Laura Bartlett.
In September 1993. the School District denied the
Morenos' claim on the basis that a guardian is not
permitted to recover for the wrongful death of a ward
and, further, that a guardian's appointment terminates
upon the death of the ward. The Morenos subsequently
filed a civil complaint in district court against the
School District, alleging that its negligent acts and
policies had proximately caused Bill's wrongful death.
The Morenos further alleged that as Bill's permanent
legal guardians and custodians, they were bringing this
action in their own behalf pursuant to section 78-11-6.
Again, Bill's natural mother was not named or joined in
the complaint.
In January 1994, the School District moved for
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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summary judgment. It alleged that the Morenos had no
legal standing to bring their wrongful death action
because they were not Bill's heirs, but merely his
guardians.
In January 1995, during the pendency of the School
District's motion for summary judgment Bartlett
moved to intervene in the action pursuant to rule 24(a)
of the Utah *888 Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming
that she, as Bill's natural mother, was the real part) in
interest and that the Morenos were not. The School
District opposed the motion, arguing that Bartlett's
claim was time-barred for failure to file a timely notice
of claim as required by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. The Morenos also opposed Bartlett's
motion, asserting that under section 78-11-6, either a
parent or a guardian can bring a claim in their own
behalf for the wrongful death of a minor, but not both.
In addition, the Morenos argued that they were, in fact,
Bill's true "parents'1 and care-givers and. furthermore,
that Bartlett had abandoned Bill many years before.
Thus, they argued, Bartlett's motion to intervene should
be denied.
In March 1995, the trial court denied the School
District's motion for summary judgment against the
Morenos, holding that the Morenos had the authority to
bring this wrongful death action in their own behalf.
The trial court also denied Bartlett's motion to
intervene as a party plaintiff, reasoning that the
Morenos, not Bartlett, were the real party in interest in
the wrongful death action by virtue of their permanent
custody and guardianship of Bill and that even if
Bartlett had retained parental rights after the Morenos
were awarded permanent custody and guardianship,
those rights terminated at Bill's death. Bartlett now
appeals from the trial court's denial of her motion to
intervene. The School District did not appeal from the
denial of its motion for summary judgment but is an
appellee in Bartlett's appeal.
On appeal, Bartlett argues that only an heir, not a
guardian, can recover for the wrongful death of a minor
child and, thus, the trial court erred in denying her
motion to intervene in the action. Bartlett further
argues that the Morenos had acted as her representative
in filing their claim against the School District and,
therefore, under rules 17 and 24(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, her intervention is timely and
proper. Finally, she asserts that a neglectfel parent is
not barredfromrecovery for the wrongful death of her
child, although issues of neglect may bear' upon the
damages she is entitled to recover.
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The Morenos respond that as Bill's guardians, the)
have a right to recover in their own behalf under
section 78-11-6 for the wrongful death of their minor
ward. In addition, they argue that an abandoning
natural parent should be precluded from recovering
under a wrongful death statute for the death of her
abandoned child.
The School District responds that the Morenos
cannot personally recover damages in their own behalf
for Bill's wrongful death because (1) only heirs can
recover for the wrongful death of a child, and guardians
are not heirs, and (2) Bartlett's parental rights had
never been terminated and she was still Bill's rightful
heir and thus entitled to bring an action as Bill's heir.
However, the School District argues that Bartlett's
claim was barred for failure to timely file a notice of
her claim as required by the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act and, therefore, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over her claim.
ANALYSIS
[1] The issue before us is whether the trial court
erred in denying Bartlett's motion to intervene in the
Morenos' action pursuant to rule 24(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
By the terms of [rule 24(a) ], an applicant must be
allowed to intervene if four requirements are met:
1) the application is timely; 2) the applicant has an
interest in the subject matter of the dispute; 3) that
interest is or may be inadequately represented, and
4) the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment
in the action.
Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279, 282 (Utah 1982)
. Such a determination may involve questions of both
law and fact.
We review a trial court's legal
conclusions nondeferentially for correctness and its
factual determinations for clear error. State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
[2][3][4][5] Section 78-11-6 of the Utah Code
establishes who may be a plaintiff in an action to
recover for the wrongful death or injury of a child.
This section provides in relevant part:
[A] parent or guardian may maintain an action for
the death or injury of a minor *889 child when the
injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another.
In interpreting section 78-11-6, this court is guided
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by the principle that a statute is generally construed
according to its plain language. State v. A House and
1. 37 Acres of Real Property located at 392 South 600
East, 886 P.2d 534, 537 (Utah 1994). We assume that
"each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the
statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading
is unreasonably confused or inoperable." Savage
Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664,
670 (Utah 1991). In addition, "[w]ords and phrases
are to be construed according to the context and the
approved usage of the language." Utah Code Ann. §
68-3-11. "Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's
plain language must we seek guidance from the
legislative history and relevant policy determinations."
World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency
Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994). Finally, "
'[o]ne of the cardinal principles of statutory
construction is that the courts will look to the reason,
spirit and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the
entire context and subject matter of the statute dealing
with the subject.' " Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Payne, 782 P.2d 464. 466 (Utah 1989) (quoting
Masich v. U.S. Smelting, 113 Utah 101, 108, 191 P.2d
612,616(1948)).
[6] Section 78-11-6 states that a parent or guardian
may maintain an action for the wrongful death of a
child. The section is silent, however, on whether a
guardian may maintain an action in his own behalf or
only in behalf of the child's heirs. Thus, we look to
adjacent provisions for guidance in interpreting this
section. See Beirett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P. 2d
367. 369 (Utah 1994) (examining preceding section to
interpret scope of particular term).
Section 78-11-7 of the Utah Code provides for
recovery7 for the death or injury of an adult. This
section is more explicit as to who can bring a claim.
This section provides in relevant part:
[W]hen the death of a person not a minor is caused
by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs,
or his personal representatives for the benefit of his
heirs, may maintain an action for damages against
the person causing the death.... If such adult person
has a guardian at the time of his death, only one
action can be maintainedfor the injury to or death
of such person, and such action may be brought
by either the personal representatives of such
adult deceased person, for the benefit of his heirs,
or by such guardian for the benefit of his heirs as
provided in the next preceding section [section
78-11-6]. In every action under this and the next
preceding section [section 78-11-6] such damages
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may be given as under all the circumstances of the
case may be just.
Utah Code Ann. J 78-11-7 (1992) (emphasis
added).
Under section 78-11-7. it is clear that the wrongful
death action of an adult can be maintained only by the
deceased's heirs or by the representative or guardian of
such person in behalf oj the heirs. Further, section
78-11-7 states that the action may be brought by the
guardian in behalf of the heirs "as provided in the next
preceding section [section 78-11-6]." Thus, the
provisions regarding who may sue and in whose behalf
they may recover under section 78-11-7 apply to suits
under section 78-11-6 by explicit reference to that
section in section 78-11-7. See also Jones v. Carve11,
641 P.2d 105. 107 (Utah 1982) (applying language
from section 78-11-7 to determine scope of damages
recoverable for wrongful death of child).
This interpretation comports with the statutes
concerning the rights and obligations of parents in
contrast to the rights and obligations of guardians with
respect to their ward. "The court may appoint a
guardian for an unemancipated minor if all parental
rights of custody have been terminated or suspended
by circumstances or prior court order." Utah Code
Ann. § 75-5-204 (emphasis added). However, even
after the parental right of custody has been terminated
and physical custody of the child is placed in a
guardian, the parent retains certain rights with respect
to the child:
"Residual parental rights and duties" means those
rights and duties remaining with the parent after
legal custody or guardianship, or both, have been
vested in *890 another person or agency,
including, but not limited to, the responsibility for
support, therightto consent to adoption, therightto
determine the child's religious affiliation, and the
right to reasonable visitation unless restricted by the
court. If no guardian has been appointed, "residual
parental rights and duties" also include therightto
consent to marriage, to enlistment, and to consent to
major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treatment.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-2(18) (1992). Other
residual parentalrightsinclude therightto inherit from
a child and vice versa. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-103,
and the right to maintain an action for the wrongful
death of a child, Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6. See also
In re IP., 648 P.2d 1364, 1366 n. 1 (Utah 1982)
(enumerating residual parental rights). Thus, the
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parent retains the responsibility to support the child as
well as certain rights including the right to visitation,
allowing the parent the possibility of maintaining a
meaningful relationship with the child despite lack of
physical custody. Furthermore, there is a distinct
procedure for the termination of all parental rights. See
Utah Code Ann §§ 78-3a-401 to -414 (Supp.1996).
On the other hand the rights and responsibilities of
a guardian are premised on the right to physical
custody of the child:
"Legal custody" means a relationship embodying
the following rights and duties:
(a) the right to physical custody of a child;
(b) the right and duty to protect, train, and
discipline him;
(c) the duty to provide him with food, clothing,
shelter, education, and ordinary medical care;
(d) the right to determine where and with whom
he shall live; and
(e) the right, in an emergency, to authorize
surgery or other extraordinary care.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-2(14) (1992); see also
Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-209 (powers and duties of
guardian of minor).
Furthermore, "[a] guardian's authority and
responsibility terminates ... upon the minor's death,
adoption, marriage, or attainment of majority, but
termination does not affect his liability for prior acts
[or] his obligation to account for funds and assets of his
ward." Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-210. Thus, while the
guardian retains such general duties as accounting for
the ward, no personal rights or responsibilities of the
guardian continue after the ward's death.
[7] Consistent with section 75-5-210, we hold that
while the rights and responsibilities of a guardian
flowing out of legal custody of the ward terminate upon
the death of the ward, the guardian's ability to maintain
an action for the wrongful death of a minor flows from
the guardian's residual duty of accounting and does not
terminate upon the minor's death. This obligation is
not for the personal benefit of the guardian, but is
among a guardian's residual duties upon the death of
his ward, and therefore any wrongfid death action must
be brought in behalf of the ward's heirs. Accordingly,

Page 6

we find that the Morenos' argument that they can
maintain an action for Bill's wrongful death in their
own behalf is not supported by the statutes at issue.
[8] The School District argues that even though
Bartlett is the real party in interest her claim is barred
for failure to file a notice of claim within one year of
the injury, pursuant to the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. Therefore, it argues, we should affirm
the trial court's denial of her motion to intervene on this
ground. Although the School District raised this
argument below, the trial court denied Bartlett's motion
on the basis that the Morenos, not Bartlett were the
real parties in interest in this action. However, we may
affirm the trial court's decision on any ground. White v.
Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Utah 1994).
Bartlett argues that the notice of claim filed by the
Morenos was filed in a representative capacity for and
in behalf of Bill's heirs and, thus, the School District
was notified of her claim pursuant to the requirements
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Bartlett
additionally argues that pursuant to rule 17 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, she may be substituted for
the Morenos as a party in the wrongful death action,
thereby also substituting herself as the claimant under
*891 the Act The School District argues, on the
other hand, that strict compliance with the Act requires
that Bartlett independently file a notice of her claim and
that Bartlett cannot evade compliance with this
requirement by intervening in the Morenos' action.
Section 63-30-13 of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act provides.
A claim agaimst a political subdivision, or against
its employee; for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
governing body of the political subdivision within
one year after the claim arises.
(Emphasis added.)
In this case, the School District is a political
subdivision. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(7)
(defining "[p]olitical subdivision" to include "school
district"). Bill's injury occurred on May 22, 1992, and
he died on June 2, 1992. Thus, prior to bringing the
action for Bill's wrongful death, the Morenos, if they
were the appropriate party, were required under the
Act to file a notuce of claim with the School District
within one year of his death, i.e., by June 2, 1993. See
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Nelson v. Logan City, 103 Utah 356, 368-69. 135 P.2d
259, 265 (1943) (holding that statute begins to run on
date of death for wrongful death claim). The Morenos
complied with the notice requirement by filing a notice
of claim with the School District on December 3,
1992. However, Bartlett did not independently file a
notice of claim with the School District and did not
move to intervene in the Morenos' action until January
1995, well beyond the time permitted by the statutory
notice requirement. Thus, the resolution of this issue
turns on whether the Morenos' notice of claim satisfies
Bartlett's notice requirement under the Act.
The Governmental Immunity Act has been strictly
construed by Utah courts. In Scarborough v. Granite
School District, 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975), this
court stated in reference to the notice requirement
under the Act, "We have consistently held that where a
cause of action is based upon a statute, full compliance
with its requirements is a condition precedent to the
right to maintain a suit."
Bartlett argues that because the Morenos filed
notice of their claim, the School District was properly
notified as to her claim. However, the Morenos' notice
of claim clearly states that the Morenos sought to
maintain a claim in their own behalf, not in a
representative capacity for Bartlett or Bill's heirs. In
fact the Morenos' notice of claim specifically states:
[T]he Morenos, as the sole and exclusive guardians
and foster parents for the minor child, are fully
entitled to bring an action for wrongful death
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-11-6. The Morenos are further convinced that
the Utah law will entitle them to recover damages
for all monetary amounts incurred by them related
to the accident and for the loss of the love,
affection, and society of the minor child.
While it is difficult to measure such losses, we
have attempted to itemize below the losses which
we believe the Morenos, as the legal and exclusive
guardians, and in loco parentis, are entitled to
recover.
(Citation omitted; emphasis added.) Further, the
notice of claim, which included a copy of the order
awarding permanent custody and guardianship of Bill
to the Morenos, does not even mention Bartlett.
Moreover, the School District clearly denied the
Morenos' claim on the basis that they brought the claim
in their own behalf, not on Bartlett's behalf. The letter

of denial stated that"(1) a guardian is not an heir of the
minor and is not entitled to inherit a share of the
minor's estate when the minor dies, and (2) the
appointment of a guardian terminates upon the minor's
death."
Therefore, this author would conclude that the
notice of claim filed by the Morenos for damages in
their own behalf clearly was not sufficient to notify the
School District of Bartlett's claim. However, a
majority of the court agrees with Justice Howe's
separate opinion that the notice provided by the
Morenos was legally sufficient to notify the School
District of Bartlett's claim.
*892. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court's denial of Bartlett's
motion to intervene and hold that Bartlett, not the
Morenos, is the real party' in interest. We further hold
that the notice provided by the Morenos was legally
sufficient to notify the School District of Bartlett's
claim.
Accordingly, we remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., concurs.
HOWE, Justice, separate opinion:
[9] I concur in that part of the lead opinion which
holds that when a guardian brings a wrongful death
action for the death of his ward, it is brought on behalf
of the ward's heirs and not for the personal benefit of
the guardian. However, I dissent as to that part which
holds that the instant action brought by the Morenos
must be dismissed because the notice of claim given to
the School District was defective.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a) provides that a
notice of claim shall contain (1) a brief statement of the
facts, (2) the nature of the claim asserted, and (3) the
damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are
known. The purpose of a notice of claim is to give
timely notice of the above requirements so that the
state or one of its political subdivisions may conduct an
investigation. In this case, that purpose was fulfilled.
The notice of claim given by the Morenos stated the
facts surrounding Bill's drowning and made claim for
his wrongful death. Amounts of damage were stated
for his hospitalization, medical care, funeral, and loss
of companionship.
Because the Morenos were
laboring under a mistake of law, they claimed damages
fortheir loss of companionship rather than for the heir's
loss.
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We hold that the notice of claim is sufficient to
support the wrongful death action filed by the Morenos
even though we have now decided that Bill's heirs, not
the Morenos, are the beneficiaries. Since section
78-11-6 authorizes a guardian to maintain an action for
the wrongful death of his ward, it follows that the
guardian has the authority to file the prerequisite notice
of claim. The notice here was timely filed, set out the
facts and the nature of the claim, and stated the
damages incurred by the claimant "so far as they are
known." The Morenos, acting upon the advice of legal
counsel and in good faith, erroneously claimed
damages for their loss of companionship because of
their misapprehension of the law. This should not be
fatal since irrespective of who the beneficiaries of a
wrongful death action are, the damages claimed for
medical, hospitalization, and funeral costs do not
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change. Only the damages for loss of companionship
might differ, [n fact because of Bartlett's detachment
from Bill, her damages might well be less than those of
the Morenos. Therefore, no prejudice can be shown to
the School District because the claim was filed b\ the
Morenos in their own behalf rather than in a
representative capacity for Bartlett or Bill's heirs.
We hold that the notice of claim given to the School
District was legally sufficient to support the
maintenance of this wrongful death action, although the
Morenos mistakenly assumed that thev, not Bartlett.
would be the beneficiaries of the action.
STEWART, Associate C.J., and DURHAM, J.,
concur.
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*480 618P.2d480
Supreme Court of Utah.
Jolene STAHL, PlaintifT and Appellant,
v.
UTA i ( TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a public agency,
Defendant and Respondent
No. 16419.
Sept. 12, 1980.
Motorist brought action against public transit
authority to recover damages sustained in automobile
accident involving a bus owned by the authority and
driven by one of its employees. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Christine M. Durham, J.,
entered judgment of default due to plaintiffs failure to
comply with statutory notice provision, and plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that
motorist substantially complied with the statute by
furnishing signed accident report and medical release
to defendant's insurance adjuster, who acted as
defendant's agent.

Pagel
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36 Ik 180 Intention of Legislature
36 Ik 184 Policy and Purpose of Act.
A statute is to be construed in light of its intended
purpose.
[4] Automobiles <@=>230
48A —
48AV Injuries from Operation, or Use of
Highway
48AV(B) Actions
48Ak230 Notice of Claim for Injury.
Motorist who was involved in automobile accident
allegedly caused by bus owned by public transit
authority, substantially complied with statutory notice
provision by supplying signed accident form and
medical release to authority's insurance adjuster, who
was authorized by law to handle approval or denial of
victim's claim and thus acted as agent of the authority.
U.C.A.1953. 11-20-56.
Wendall E. Bennett, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and
appellant.

Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Statutes <@^223.1
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361 V1(A) General Rules of Construction
361k223 Construction with Reference to
Other Statutes
36lk223.1 In General.
Statutory provision must be construed so as to
make it harmonious with other statutes relevant to the
subject matter.
[2] Statutes <@^=>227
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k227 Construction as Mandatory or
Directory.
Generally, a direction in a statute to do an act is
considered "mandatory" when consequences are
attached to the failure to act; conversely, when a
statute requires an action to be taken without
prescribing a penalty for failure to so act, the
requirement is not often deemed mandatory.
[3] Statutes <®=* 184
361 —

Rex J. Hanson, David H. Epperson, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and respondent.
STEWART, Justice:
On September 9, 1976, in Salt Lake City a bus
owned by the Utah Transit Authority ("UTA") and
driven by a UTA employee collided with the rear end
of an automobile which in turn collided head-on with
an automobile driven by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was
taken to the Valley West Hospital for examination.
Upon returning to work that same day plaintiff was
contacted by Thomas Vance, an insurance adjuster for
Brown Brothers Insurance, which represents UTA's
insurer. Transit Casualty. He obtained a statement
from her concerning the accident and wrote a two-page
report based on her answers to his inquiries. Vance
also had plaintiff sign a statement and a medical
information release allowing her personal physician to
disclose information to him.
On December 28, 1976, after 31/2 months had
elapsed with no action by the insurance company or
UTA, plaintiff retained counsel. The following day
counsel sent a written notice of claim to the Utah
Transit Authority and to the Utah Attorney General.
Suit was filed in district court July 14, 1977.
On motion the case was dismissed without
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prejudice. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint,
along with depositions of herself and the insurance
adjuster, Vance. UTA moved for summary judgment
for failure to comply with s 11-20-56 U.C.A., as
amended, a part of the Utah Public Transit District Act.
That section provides:
Claims against district-Requirements.-Eveiy
claim against the district for *481 death, injury or
damage alleged to have been caused by the
negligent act or omission of the district shall be
presented to the board of directors in writing within
thirty7 days after the death, injury, or damage, signed
and verified by the claimant or his duly authorized
agent, stating the time and place where the injury or
damage occurred and a general statement of the
cause and circumstances of the death, injury or
damages. No action under this section shall be
commenced until sixty days after presentation, or
unless the board of directors shall sooner deny
claim. (Emphasis added.)
On the basis of that statute a judgment of dismissal
was entered, and this appeal ensued. For the purpose
of this appeal we state the facts developed in discovery
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that the provision above cited
was not intended to be a statute of limitations and that s
63-30-12 of the Governmental Immunity Act provides
the relevant statute of limitation in this case. Plaintiff
also contends that UTA is estopped from relying on s
11-20-56 as a result of the actions of the insurance
adjustor.
(1) Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d
100, 485 P.2d 1035 (1971), held that it is for the
judiciary to assume that each term of a statute was
advisedly adopted by the Legislature. It is also our
duty to construe a statutory provision so as to make it
harmonious with other statutes relevant to the subject
matter. The language in the Utah Public Transit
District Act stands in direct contrast to the general
notice of claim provision found in the Governmental
Immunity Act enacted in 1965, four years prior to the
Public Transit Act. The Governmental Immunity Act
makes clear that a failure to comply with the notice
provision results in a bar to prosecution of the action.
Section 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as
amended, provides that:
Claim against state or agency-Notice to attorney
general and agency-Time for filing.-A claim against
the state or any agency thereof as defined herein
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shall be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed
with the attorney general of the state of Utah and
the agency concerned within one year after the
cause of action arises. (Emphasis added.)
Section 63-30-13 includes the same mandatory
language in prescribing the penalty for noncompliance
with the notice: requirement regarding claims against
political subdivisions.
(2) We are guided in construing the language of the
instant statute by the principle that generally7 a direction
in a statute to do an act is considered "mandatory"
when consequences are attached to the failure to act.
Conversely, when a statute requires an action to be
taken without prescribing a penalty for failure to so act,
the requirement is not often deemed mandatory.
Whitley v. Superior Ct., 18 Cal.2d 75, 113 P.2d 449
(1941). See Barton v. Atkinson, 228 Ga. 733. 187
S.E.2d 835 (1972); Paul v. City of Manhattan, 212
Kan. 381, 511 P.2d 244 (1973); State ex rel. Ferro v.
Oellermann, Mo., 458 S.W.2d 583 (1970); Dunker v.
Brown County Bd. of Ed., 80 S.D. 193, 121 N.W.2d
10 (1963); Chisholm v. Bewley Mills. 155 Tex. 400.
287 S.W.2d 943 (1956); State ex rel. Werlein v.
Elamore, 33 Wis.2d 288, 147 N.W.2d 252 (1967).
Further assistance in this case is provided by
viewing the pertinent language in light of our
Legislature's choice of language construction in similar
provisions. The difference thus uncovered signifies a
purposeful selection and indicates the intended
meaning. See Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, 96 Utah 450,
85 P.2d 831 (1939); Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Board
of Review, 118 Utah 619, 223 P.2d 586 (1950);
Ballou v. Kemp, 92 F.2d 556 (DC. Cir. 1937);
Commonwealth v. Reick Investment Corp., 419 Pa. 52,
213 A.2d 277 (1965).
The express bar against maintaining an action for
noncompliance with the notice provision in the
Governmental Immunity Act, when compared with the
Utah Public Transit District Act, which contains no
such language, indicates an intent on the part of the
Legislature not to impose a bar for
*482
noncompliance with the notice provision of the latter
act. It is not for the Court to read into the statute an
intention to establish a statute of limitations which is
not expressly stated in the statute.
The cases cited by defendant which hold a statutory
notice requirement mandatory and a bar to filing an
action without strict compliance with the time
limitation involve statutory
language which
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unequivocally designates a legislative intent to have the
failure to comply stand as a bar to further action.
These cases therefore are not controlling in the instant
case. See Crowder v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 552
P.2d 646 (1976); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d
27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972); Peterson v. Salt Lake City,
118 Utah 231, 221 P.2d 591 (1950).
Moreover, there was substantial compliance with
the 30-day notice provision and defendant was in no
way prejudiced by plaintiffs failure to comply with the
formality of filing a claim.
(3) A statute is, of course, to be construed in light
of its intended purpose. Child v. City of Spanish Fork,
Utah, 538 P.2d 184 (1975). It is necessary to consider
the policy of the notice requirement so that in any
particular case the facts can be evaluated to determine
if the intent of the statute has been accomplished by
substantial compliance with the statutory directive.
Smith v. State, Ala., 364 So.2d 1 (1978). This Court
has previously stated that the primary purpose of a
notice of claim requirement is to afford the responsible
public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper
and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to
arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby
avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for costly
and unnecessary litigation. Sears v. Southworth, Utah,
563 P.2d 192 (1977); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27
Utah 2d 27,492 P.2d 1335 (1972).
We view plaintiffs contention that the notice given
to the insurance adjuster in this case constituted
compliance with the statute in light of these policy
considerations. First, we note that s 63-30-14 of the
Governmental Immunity Act equates the authority of
the insurance carrier with that of the governmental
entity concerning the notice to claimant of the approval
or denial of a claim for injury. Thus the insurance
agent is authorized by law to handle the approval or
denial of plaintiffs claim, representing the interests of
the government. Rice v. Granite School District 23
Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969). Further, Vance
testified in this case that all claims against UTA are
handled directly by his office and specifically by
himself. The record also reveals that UTA informed
Vance of the accident shortly after its occurrence. He
immediately contacted plaintiff on the same day as the
accident, obtained a signed statement of her version of
the incident, and received a medical release form from
her. In light of these facts, Vance's actions in obtaining
a signed statement of plaintiffs version of the accident
were for all practical purposes the acts of UTA.

(4) Clearly there was substantial compliance with
the notice provision. No undue hardship resulted from
the notice being given to an agent of the party named in
the statute. Considering the duties delegated to the
insurance agent, it appears that the person entrusted
with the investigation and settlement procedures
received the requisite information in a timely fashion
and within the time constraints imposed by the statute.
Furthermore, conceding there is some validity to the
necessity of having a notice in writing to guard against
the unreliability of memory, the information given was
committed to writing in a two-page report and signed
by plaintiff, thus recording plaintiffs account of the
accident.
A case closely in point with the ca^e at bar is
Badger v. Upper Darby Township, 348 Pa. 551, 36
A.2d 507 (1944). Plaintiffs counsel, within the
prescribed period, gave written notice to the insurance
carrier for the defendant township rather than the clerk
or secretary of such municipality, as required by
statute. The court, in allowing plaintiff to maintain an
action for damages, declared:
*483. In determining, in its discretion, whether a
failure to file the notice prescribed by the act should
be excused, a weight} circumstance to be
considered by the court is whether or not the
municipality has suffered any undue hardship.
Here there is nothing to indicate that it did so suffer.
Of controlling importance is the fact that within the
prescribed period the insurance company was
notified that claim was being made, was furnished
with the essential facts in regard to the accident,
and, by designating a physician to examine
plaintiff, apparently admitted its responsibility to
investigate the claim. If, as would appear, the
insurance company is the real party in interest, a
decision denying plaintiff the right to prosecute her
claim because of failure to give written notice to the
township would be one of sheer literalism, for, had
such notice been given, the township would
undoubtedly, in due course, have turned it over to
the company to which plaintiffs counsel had sent it
in the first instance. It is not unusual for lawyers
representing claimants in accident cases to
communicate with insurance companies directly
rather than with defendants, since the former
control the negotiations for settlement and prepare
the defense in case of litigation. (Emphasis added.)
(36 A.2d at 508-09.)
The instant case is clearly distinguishable from
Moran v. Salt Lake City, 53 Utah 407, 173 P. 702
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(1918). In that case a notice was presented to a party
other than the recipient prescribed by statute. The
Court consequently found the notice to be inadequate.
The Court in Moran specifically found that the board to
whom notice had been given lacked authority to
consider or settle damage claims against the city for
any acts of negligence. In the instant case, as pointed
above, the insurance carrier through its agent has
specific authority to consider and settle damage claims.
The cases cited by defendant in support of the
contention that notice to the insurance agent does not
comply with the notice requirement are distinguishable
from the instant case. In those cases, the applicable
statutes contained words of absolute prohibition as a
consequence of noncompliance, thus suggesting a
stricter standard of adherence. Sears v. Southworth,
Utah, 563 R2d 192 (1977); Scarborough v. Granite
School District, Utah, 531 P.2d 480 (1975); Varoz v.
Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973);
Roosendaal Construction and Mining Corp. v. Holman,
28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972). Furthermore, it
should be noted in the instant case that plaintiff met the
strict requirements placed on the cause of action by (1)
the statute of limitation found in s 63-30-12 of the
Governmental Immunity Act and (2) the prohibition
against any action being brought until sixty days after
presentation of notice found in s 11-20-56 of the Utah
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Public Transit District Act.
Other couits have also construed similar statutory
notice requirements to hold mat substantial compliance
meets the statutory requirements even in the face of
mandatory language. Ray v. City of Council Bluffs,
193 Iowa 620, 187 NW. 447 (1922); Brickell v.
Kansas City. 364 Mo. 679, 265 S.W.2d 342 (1954);
Peterson v. Kansas City, 324 Mo. 454, 23 S.W.2d
1045 (1930); Shaw v. City of New York, 83 AJD. 212,
82N.Y.S.44(1903).
In sum, the purpose of the notice requirement was
satisfied.
Plaintiffs second contention is that UTA is
estopped from relying on the notice of claim
requirement in light of the insurance adjuster's conduct.
Whether the facts in this case support an estoppel or
waiver theory need not be decided in light of the
foregoing.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a trial on
the merits.
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, MAUGHAN
and HALL, JJ., concur.
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*480 531R2d480
Supreme Court of Utah.
Francine G. SCARBOROUGH, for herself and as
guardian for
Jeffrey Dean Scarborough, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
GRANITE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political
subdivision of the
State of Utah, Defendant and Respondent
No. 13558.
Feb. 3, 1975.
Mother sought to recover for injuries sustained by
12-year-old son when he fell while playing with dead
wires dangling from utility poles on elementary school
playground. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., J., dismissed the action,
and mother appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett,
J., held that conversation between mother and school
principal in which principal allegedly stated wires
were left in such condition by utility company, coupled
with a report of principal's investigation filed with
school district office, did not constitute a 'filing' of a
claim that would meet requirements of statute
governing time for filing claim against political
subdivision and that alleged statement by principal that
wires were left in such condition by utility company did
not estop school district from asserting such statute as
bar to cause of action, where principal did not make
any representation that school district was responsible
and where he told mother that he could not give any
information or do anything about the situation and that
the problem would have to be taken up with the school
district office.
Affirmed.
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Action @^>10
13 —
131 Grounds and Conditions Precedent
13k 10 Conditions Precedent in General.
Where cause of action is based upon statute, full
compliance with its requirements is condition
precedent to the right to maintain a suit.
[2] Schools®^ 112
345 —
345II Public Schools
Copyright (c) West Group 2000

Pagel
34511(1) Claims Against District
345kll2 Presentation and Allowance
Claims.

of

(Formerly 345k 12)
In order to meet requirements of statute, providing
that "claim against a political subdivision shall be
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within
ninety days after the cause of action arises," and to
fulfill its intended purpose, the "filing" of a claim must
include: that it be in writing; that it contain brief
statement of facts and the nature of claim asserted; that
it be subscribed by party required to give it and who
intends to rely on it; that it be directed to and delivered
to someone authorized to or responsible for receiving
it; and that this be done within prescribed time.
U.C.A. 1953,63-30-13.
[3] Schools®^ 112
345 —
345II Public Schools
34511(1) Claims Against District
345kll2 Presentation and Allowance
Claims.

of

(Formerly 345k 12)
Where elementary school student was injured on
playground while playing with dead wires dangling
from utility poles, subsequent conversation between
student's mother and principal in which principal
allegedly stated that wires were left in such condition
by utility company, coupled with a report of principal's
investigation filed with school district office, did not
constitute a "filing" within purview of statute requiring
that a "claim against a political subdivision shall be
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within
ninety7 days after the cause of action arises."
U.C.A.1953,63-30-2, 63-30-3,63-30-13.
[4] Estoppel @=*62.5
156 —
156III Equitable Estoppel
156111(A) Nature and Essentials in General
156k62
Estoppel
Against
Public,
Government, or Public
Officers
156k62.5 Acts of Officers or Boards.
After elementary school student was injured on
playground while playing with dead wires dangling
from utility poles, alleged statement by school principal
to student's mother that wires had been left in that
condition by utility company did not estop school
district from asserting statute governing time for filing
claim against political subdivision as bar to cause of
action after mother learned school employees were
claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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responsible for the condition, where principal made no
representation that school district was responsible and
where he told mother that he could not give her any
information or do anything about the situation and that
the problem would have to be taken up with school
district office.
U.C.A.1953, 63-30-2, 63-30-3,
63-30-13.

handle this matter. It is alleged that in reliance on Mr.
Anderson's statements, the attorney made demand upon
the Utah Power & Light Company, and further, that it
was not until six months later plaintiff learned that it
was not Utah Power & Light Company, but employees
of the School District who had done the work and left
the wires in that condition.

*481 James F. Housley, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff and appellant.

The statute of concern here upon which the court
based its dismissal is Section 63-30-13, U.C.A.1953:

Leonard H. Russon. of Hanson, Wadsworth &
Russon, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

A claim against a political subdivision shall be
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within
ninety (90) days after the cause of action arises

CROCKETT, Justice:
Plaintiff Francine G. Scarborough, for herself and
as guardian for her 12-year-old son Jeffrey, sues to
recover for injuries he suffered in a fall on the
playground at the Holladay Elementary School of the
defendant. Granite School District. Upon the basis of
the pleadings, depositions and affidavits, the trial court
ruled that because the plaintiff had failed to file a claim
as required by Section 63-30-13, U.C.A.1953,
quoted below, her action was barred; and therefore
there was no issue of material fact which if resolved in
her favor would entitle her to prevail, and entered
judgment of dismissal against her. ([FN1]) She
appeals.
On the morning of February 29, 1972, Jeffrey, and
other boys were playing on the ball ground of the
School. About a month before, one of the utility poles
had been knocked down by maintenance employees
while trimming trees; and some dead wires had been
left dangling from the remaining poles. It was in
playing and swinging with these wires that Jeffrey fell
several feet to the ground and suffered the injuries
complained of. The principal, William Lee Anderson,
was informed, examined and talked to the boy, and
permitted him to go to class. About an hour later,
Jeffrey developed nausea and began vomiting. His
mother was called and she took him home.
Later that day she called Mr. Anderson and talked
to him about the apparently serious nature of Jeffrey's
injuries, asked for details concerning the accident and
responsibility therefor. She avers that he told her that
the tree trimming had been done and the wires left in
that condition by the utility company, Utah Power &
Light Company. ([FN2]) Mr. Anderson filed a report
of his investigation with the office of defendant,
Granite School District. Two days after the accident,
plaintiff employed an attorney (not present counsel) to

Plaintiff makes no contention that there was any
literal compliance with that statute in the usual form or
sense.
Her argument is that because of the
conversations with the principal, his representations as
to who was responsible; and his report to the School
District it should be deemed: (1) that she had made a
sufficient 'filing' of a claim to satisfy the requirements
of the statute; and (2) that the School District should be
estopped to assert the protection of the statute.
*482 Oral Statements as a 'Filing'
[1][2][3] The School District is a political
subdivision of the state. ([FN3]) Therefore it would
normally be immune from suit; and the right to sue is
an exception created by statute. ([FN4]) We have
consistently held that where a cause of action is based
upon a statute, full compliance with its requirements is
a condition precedent to the right to maintain a suit.
([FN5]) In order to so meet the requirements of the
statute quoted above and fulfill its intended purpose,
the 'filing' of a claim should include these essentials:
that it be in wiriting; ([FN6]) that it contain a brief
statement of the facts and the nature of the claim
asserted, that it be subscribed by the party required to
give it and who intends to rely on it; that it be directed
to and delivered to someone authorized to or
responsible for receiving it; and that this be done
within the prescribed time. ([FN7]) It should require
no exposition to demonstrate that the oral conversation
with the school principal, and the fact that he turned in
a report to the School District, do not satisfy the
foregoing requirements.
The Claimed Estoppel
[4] On her issue relating to estoppel, the plaintiff
argues that the conversation with the school principal
brings her case within the ruling of this court in Rice v.
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Granite School District. ([FN8]) There are significant
differences between this case and that one. There the
plaintiff had filed a timely written notice with the
School District. The plaintiffs contention was that the
insurance adjuster, who was handling the matter for the
School District gave the plaintiff assurances that the
case would be settled after the extent of injuries and
damages had been determined, and that this lulled her
into a sense of security until after the time for filing the
suit had expired. Then the School District attempted to
assert that as a defense. We remanded for a trial as to
the facts.
Here there is no averment that the principal, Mr.
Anderson, made any representation, either that the
School District was responsible, or that it would be
responsible, to the plaintiff. The best that can be said
from the plaintiffs point of view is that he told her
either: that the Utah Power & Light Company was
responsible, or that he was not sure who was
responsible for the condition of the wires. But it is
without dispute that he told her that he could not give
her any information or do anything about it, and that
that would have to be done with Dr. Lloyd of the
School District office. Accordingly, he did nothing to
delude, dissuade or delay plaintiff or her attorney in the
filing of her claim.
From what has been said herein it is our conclusion
that the trial court could properly rule as a matter of
law that because of the plaintiffs failure to file a claim
within the time allowed by the statute; and because
there is no basis upon which estoppel against the
defendant's reliance on the statute could be made out,
that she cannot show entitlement to maintain this
action.
Affirmed. No costs awarded.
HENRIOD, C.J., and ELLETT and TUCKETT,
JJ., concur.
MAUGHAN, Justice (dissenting):

Page 3
ninety days after the cause of action arises;
provided, however, that any claim filed against a
city or incorporated town under section 63—30—8
shall be governed by the provisions of section
10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.

First it says that a claim against a political
subdivision will be barred, unless notice of the claim is
filed within ninety days after the cause of action arises.
Second, it says that any claim filed against a city or
incorporated town under this section, shall not be
governed by the provisions of 63-30-13, but shall be
governed by the provisions of 10—7—77. The first part
of the statute says nothing about a written notice, nor to
whom notice shall be delivered. The second part of the
statute requires examination of 10—7—77, which
specifies that the claim referred to there must be in
writing. It further is very explicit about what the notice
of the claim must contain, and to whom it must be
presented. These two statutes are distinctly different.
They are similar only in the fact that both require some
notice.
The purpose of statutes requiring the presentation
of claims to political subdivisions, prior to filing a suit,
is in furtherance of public policy to prevent
unnecessary litigation.
The purpose of notice
provisions is to afford the political subdivision an
opportunity to investigate the claim while the matter is
of recent memory, witnesses are yet available,
conditions have not materially changed and to
determine if there is liability, and if there is. the extent
of it. These salutary provisions do serve to prevent
needless litigation. ([FN1]) The procedure set out in
the main opinion is merely more mechanistic, but
would not impart any more notice than defendant had.
The main opinion has engrafted on 63—30-13 all
manner of requirements for the notice, which are not
set forth in the statute, nor necessary. The subject
statute says nothing about written notice, but the main
opinion cites the case of Tooele Meat & Storage Co. v.
Morse, 43 Utah 515, 136 P. 965, wherein. Mr. Justice
Frick says:

I respectfully dissent.

*483 Our statute, 63-30-13, U.C.A.1953, as
amended, says two things:

We think the law is well settled that where a statute
requires notice to be given but is silent with respect
to the manner of notification, written notice is
understood. . . . A substantial compliance with the
statute in that regard is, we think, all that is
necessary.

A claim against a political subdivision shall be
forever barred unless notice thereof is filed within

In support of that proposition, Mr. Justice Frick
cites 29 Cvc. 1117:

The facts as stated by Mr. Justice Crockett are
accepted.
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The general rule in respect to notices is that mere
informalities do not vitiate them so long as they do
not mislead, and give the necessary information to
the proper parties.
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(FN3.)
Sec. 63-30-2, U.C.A.1953, defines a
political subdivision as:'. . . any county, city, town,
school district.. /

In view of the fact that our statutes are to be
liberally construed to effect their objectives and to
promote justice, ([FN2]) I would not extend by
implication, the terms of 63—30—13, particularly
where it is invoked by a political subdivision to avoid
liability. ([FN3])]

(FN4.) See Sec. 6 3 - 3 0 - 3 , U.C.A.1953.

*484. Given the salutary public policy in
63—30—13, allowing one redress against a political
subdivision, the lack of express requirements, and the
substantial compliance doctrine set forth in the Tooele
case, I would hold the following:

(FN6.) That an oral notice does not suffice as a
'filing,' but it must be in writing, see Tooele Meat &
Storage Co. v. Morse, 43 Utah 515, 136 P. 965;
and see 66 C.J.S. Notice s 16, p. 656; and 58
Am.Jur.2d, Notice, p. 505.

That defendant did have notice, that it had written
notice (in the form of the school principal's written
report, filed with defendant), that it was not misled, and
that it had all of the opportunities the statute means to
provide it, viz., an opportunity to investigate, to secure
its witnesses, to determine liability and the extent of it,
all before a material change in conditions. If anyone
were misled, plaintiff was.

(FN7.)
56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations,
Counties and Other Political Subdivisions, Sec.
683.

That if the foregoing were not determinative of this
matter (and I think it is), the conflict in the statements
of plaintiff and the school principal necessarily needs
to be determined at trial, and if determined in plaintiffs
favor, such would be sufficient to allow the action,
because the detrimental effect of the misleading
statement would thereby be cured.

(FN2.) Sec. 6 8 - 3 - 2 , U.C.A.1953.

That the holding of the district court be reversed
and the matter remanded for trial.
(FN1.) SeeRule56,U.R.C.P.
(FN2.) Mr. Anderson denied this, but in view of the
rejection of her cause by dismissal, for the purpose
of determining the correctness of the ruling, we
accept her averment as the fact.

(FN5.) Varoz v. Sevey. 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d
435 (1973): Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d
27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972): Hurley v." Bingham, 63
Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924).

(FN8.) 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159.
(FN1.) 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, etc..
Sec. 686.

(FN3.) 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, etc.,
Sec. 687.
FN4. See the dissents in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27
Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972); Varoz v.
Sevey, 29 Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973).
FN5. The instant matter sparks recollection of the
instructions given by the Khalif Omar, to his first
Kadi c. 900 A.D.: 'If thou seest fit to judge
differently from yesterday, do not hesitate to follow
the truth as thou seest it; for truth is eternal and it is
better to return to the true than to persist in the
false!'
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*1294 911 P.2d 1294
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Ron BELLONIO, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION and Salt
Lake Airport Authority,
Defendants and Appellant
No. 950260-CA.
Feb. 15, 1996.
Pedestrian who tripped and fell in parking terrace at
city airport brought personal injury action against city.
City moved for dismissal for failure to comply with
notice requirements of Utah Governmental Immunity
Act. The Third District Court Homer F. Wilkinson, J.,
refused to dismiss. City sought interlocutory appeal.
The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that
pedestrian failed to serve governing body of city,
precluding action.
Reversed and remanded.
Orme, P.J.. concurred in result.
West Headnotes
[ 1 ] Appeal and Error <S=^842( 1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or
of Fact
30k842(l) In General.
Statutory interpretation is question of law which
Court of Appeals reviews for correctness, granting no
deference to trial court's determinations.
[2] Statutes €=^188
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361kl87 Meaning of Language
361kl88 In General.
[See headnote text below]
[2] Statutes®^ 190
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
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361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
36 Ik 187 Meaning of Language
361 k 190 Existence of Ambiguity.
When interpreting statute, Court of Appeals begins
by examining its plain language, and will resort to
other methods of statutory interpretation only if it finds
language of statute to be ambiguous.
[3] Municipal Corporations <@=^741.30
268 —
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in
General
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims
for Injury
268k741.30 Service or Presentation; Time
Therefor.
Under plain meaning of Utah Governmental
Immunity Act claim against political subdivision is
barred unless notice is filed with "governing body"
within one year of claim arising. U.C.A.1953,
63-30-13.
[4] Municipal Corporations <&z*141.30
268 —
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in
General
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims
for Injury
268k741.30 Service or Presentation; Time
Therefor.
"Governing body" of city, within meaning of Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, is mayor and city
council. U.C.A.1953, 10-1-104(2).
[5] Municipal Corporations ® ^ 8 5 7
268 —
268X11 Torts
268XII(E) Condition or Use of Public
Buildings and Other
Property
268k857 Actions for Injuries.
Tort claim of pedestrian who tripped and fell in
parking terrace of city airport was barred, where
pedestrian failed to file notice of claim with either
mayor or city council, even though airport's counsel
told him to direct all correspondence to him personally,
since pedestrian demonstrated understanding that
service upon airport's counsel would not be sufficient
under Utah Governmental Immunity Act, and airport's
counsel was not agent of city. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-13.
[6] Municipal Corporations ®^741.20
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268 —
268X11 Torts
268XH(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in
General
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims
for Injury
268k741.20 Requirement as Mandatory or
Condition Precedent.
Since notice of claim was statutory' prerequisite to
tort suit under Utah Governmental Immunity Act trial
court was without jurisdiction to hear case of injured
pedestrian who failed to serve notice on proper parties.
U.C.A.1953,63-30-13.
*1295 Roger H. Bullock (argued), Strong &
Hanni, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Gordon K. Jensen (argued), Lehman. Jensen &
Donahue, L.C., Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before ORME, P.J., DAVIS, Associate P.J., and
GREENWOOD, J.
OPINION
GREENWOOD. Judge:
Appellant Salt Lake City Corporation (the City), on
interlocutory appeal, seeks reversal of the trial court's
refiisal to dismiss appellee Ron Bellonio's action,
despite his failure to strictly comply with the relevant
notice of claim requirements of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -13
(1993). We reverse.

BACKGROUND
Bellonio's cause of action arose on June 14, 1992,
when he tripped and fell in the parking terrace at the
Salt Lake International Airport (the Airport). Utilizing
a "fill-in-the-blank" letter, dated July 9, 1992,
Bellonio's first attorney informed the Airport's
insurance carrier that he was representing Bellonio
with respect to an accident which had occurred at the
Airport. This letter was forwarded to Robert M. Kern,
counsel for the Airport, who responded, on Jury 22,
1992, instructing Bellonio to address future
communications to his office.
On December 7, 1992, Bellonio's second attorney
sent a letter to the Airport's safety officer, requesting
any reports regarding the accident. This letter was
forwarded to Kern, who again requested, on December
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22, 1992, that all communications go through his
office.
Bellonio's attorney then sent a second letter to
Kern, dated December 28, 1992, again requesting
information and suggesting that settlement negotiations
take place. In this letter Bellonio's counsel indicated
his awareness of the potential bar of governmental
immunity—even citing the relevant code sections—and
of the procedures necessary to comply therewith.
On January7 4, 1993, Kern responded that he did not
possess much of the requested information and that the
rest was likely privileged. On March 24, 1993,
Bellonio's attorney sent a letter describing his theory of
the Airport's liability. He also provided a synopsis of
Bellonio's medical expenses to date and threatened to
file a "Notice of Intent to Commence Legal Action" if
no settlement took place. Kern acknowledged receipt
of this letter on April 6, 1993, and indicated he was
awaiting reports by Bellonio's experts indicating any
possible liability on the part of the Airport.
On June 11, 1993. Bellonio's attorney prepared a
document titled "NOTICE OF INTENT TO
COMMENCE LEGAL ACTION AGAINST THE
STATE OF UTAH OR ONE OF ITS POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS."
This document was served by
mail upon the Utah Attorney General, the Salt Lake
City Attorney, the Airport Director, *1296 and Kern,
but not upon the City's Mayor or the Salt Lake City
Council.
Finally, Bellonio's third set of attorneys filed a
complaint against the City and the Airport on June 14,
1994. The trial court dismissed the claims against the
Airport, having determined it was a division of Salt
Lake City Coq>oration, rather than a governmental
entity in its own right. This dismissal has not been
appealed. The City also sought dismissal due to
Bellonio's failure to comply with the notice of claim
procedures of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
The trial court denied this motion and the City brought
this interlocutory appeal.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
The sole issue before this court is whether Bellonio
properly complied with those notice of claim
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
which apply when an individual sues a political
subdivision. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -13
(1993). Belionio argues that constructive notice to the
governmental entity, coupled with substantial
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compliance with respect to the form of the notice, is
sufficient. The City disagrees, contending that only
actual notice and strict compliance with all aspects of
the notice of claim requirements will satisfy the
Governmental Immunity Act.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Statutory interpretation is a question of law
which we review for correctness, granting no deference
to the trial court's determinations. Bhttain v. State,
882 P.2d 666,668 (Utah App. 1994).
ANALYSIS
This court has addressed the requirements for filing
a proper notice of claim in two recent cases. See
generally Bischel v. Memtt, 907 P.2d 275 (Utah
App. 1995) and Bhttain, 882 P.2d at 666. From both
the language of the Governmental Immunity Act and
extant case law, some initial guiding principles are
clear. First the Governmental Immunity Act requires
that "[a]ny person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity ... shall file a written notice of
claim with the entity before maintaining an action."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (1993) (emphasis
added). Second, this notice of claim must be filed with
the correct persons or entities. See id. §§ 63-30-12,
-13 (1993); see also Yates v. Vernal Family Health
Ctr., 617 R2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980); Lamarrv. Utah
State Department ofTransp., 828 P.2d 535. 540-41
(Utah App. 1992).
In the case of a political subdivision such as the
City, "[a] claim ... isbarred unless notice of claim is
filed with the governing body of the political
subdivision within one year after the claim arises."
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993) (emphasis added);
Yates, 617 P.2d at 354. Bellonio argues the notices he
filed with the attorney general, the Salt Lake City
Attorney, the Airport Director and Kern satisfied the
statutory requirements. (FN1) We disagree.
[2] [3] When interpreting a statute, we begin by
examining its plain language. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d
843, 845 (Utah 1992); Bhttain, 882 P.2d at 670. "We
will resort to other methods of statutory interpretation
only if we find the language of the statutes to be
ambiguous." Vigil, 842 P.2d at 845. In this particular
case, we need look no further than the statute's
language. The plain meaning of section 13 is that a
claim against a political subdivision is "barred" unless
notice is filed with the "governing body" within one
year of the claim arising. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13

Page 3

(1993). The only remaining question concerns the
term "governing body."
[4] [5] Under existing statutory and case law there
is no ambiguity to the term "governing body." The
"governing body" of Salt Lake City is the mayor and
the city council. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(2)
(1992) (FN2); accord Yates, 617 P.2d at 354 (finding
that *1297
"governing body" was the county
commission and that failure to file notice with the
commission was fatal to plaintiffs claim). Because
Bellonio never filed his notice of claim with either the
mayor or the city* council, his claim is barred. Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993).
Bellonio argues that "governing body" contains a
latent ambiguity and that, even if we find that it does
not it should be interpreted in an equitable fashion
since service upon the Salt Lake City Attorney
substantially fulfills the purposes behind the notice of
claim requirement. We disagree. As noted in previous
opinions of this court and the supreme court:
" 'The primary purpose of a notice of claim
requirement is to afford the responsible public
authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and
timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to
arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby
avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for
costly and unnecessary litigation.'"
Bischel, 907 P.2d at 278 (quoting Bhttain, 882
P.2d at 671 (quoting Stahl v. Utah Transit Auth., 618
P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980))). While this statement,
and others like it. may seem to indicate a flexible rule
of constructive notice to governmental entities, this is
not the general rule in this state.
Utah courts have typically required strict
compliance with the notice of claim requirements
except in certain very limited circumstances. See, e.g.,
Scarborough v. Granite School Dist., 531 P.2d 480,
482 (Utah 1975) (construing former statute and noting
that "where a cause of action is based upon a statute,
full compliance with its requirements is a condition
precedent to the right to maintain a suit."); see also
Bhttain, 882 P.2d at 669.
Nevertheless, in two recent opinions from this
court, plaintiffs have been allowed to proceed despite
certain inadequacies in their notice of claim filings.
See Bischel, 907 P.2d at 279; Bhttain, 882 P.2d at
672-73. However, the precedential effect of those
cases is limited by their unique factual underpinnings
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and therefore, neither should be construed as an
indication that we are prepared to abrogate the longstanding rule requiring strict compliance with all
aspects of the Governmental Immunity Act.
In Brittain, we determined that service of a notice
of claim upon the attorney general and upon the State
Division of Risk Management satisfied Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993), which requires service upon
the attorney general and upon the "agency concerned."
882 P.2d at 672. Brittain, however, is distinguishable
from the present appeal in that it involved section 12
rather than section 13 of the Governmental Immunity
Act. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993)
with Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993). Therefore,
while this court found it reasonable to construe Risk
Management as the "agency concerned" in section 12,
it does not follow, a fortiori, that the Salt Lake City
Attorney is the "governing body" of Salt Lake City in
section 13. In fact, in contradistinction to section 12,
section 13 contains no indication that the City's legal
counsel is entitled to any notice of claim. See Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993).
Section 13, unlike section 12. contemplates that a
notice of claim is to be directed only to a political
subdivision's governing body, not to its legal counsel.
This interpretation is consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court's earlier pronouncements that a primary purpose
of the notice of claim is to "afford the responsible
public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper
and timely investigation of the merits of a claim."
Stahl, 618 P.2d at 482 (construing section 12)
(emphasis added).
Given our determination that section 13 requires
service upon the mayor and the city council, this court's
recent opinion in Bischel requires some elucidation. In
Bischel, this court allowed a claim against Salt Lake
County to proceed despite the fact that the notice of
claim was, in fact, served upon the Salt Lake County
Attorney, rather than upon the Salt Lake County
Commission as dictated by section 13. Bischel 907
P.2d at 278. While Bischel may, at first blush, appear
to be controlling in this case, that opinion was based
upon a unique set of facts which is absent in this
appeal.
In Bischel the plaintiff was unsure of how to serve
the county commission with a notice of claim;
therefore, she did an entirely sensible thing and called
the commission to ask for instructions. Id She was
instructed, by *1298. an agent of the commission, to
serve her notice of claim upon the Salt Lake County
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Attorney. Id On those facts, this court found that the
plaintiff had complied with the statute, as
misinterpreted for her by the county commission. Id.
at 279. Thus, the end result in Bischel was not based
upon a substantial compliance or constructive notice
theory, but rather was founded upon the apparent
agency of the commission employee. Id. at 278-79.
The inequity of allowing the commission to base its
defense upon its agent's misinformation prompted this
court to utilize an estoppel-type argument to prevent
the commission from forging the shield of
governmental immunity into a sword. Id. at 279; see
also id. at 280 (Bench, J., dissenting) (stating that
majority's theory is implicitly one of estoppel).
Bellonio attempts to place himself within a similar
factual scenario, arguing that the Airport's counsel told
him to direct all correspondence to him personally.
While it is clear that Kern did make such a request he
never indicated either expressly or impliedly, that he
was the proper agent to receive the statutorily
mandated notice of claim, nor did Bellonio request
from him any information regarding Governmental
Immunity Act compliance. See Scarborough, 531
P.2d at 482 (finding no basis, under former law, for
estoppel when principal of school admitted no liability
and did nothing to hinder plaintiffs filing of notice of
claim).
Furthermore, Bellonio's December 28, 1992 letter
to Kern demonstrated Bellonio's apparent familiarity
with the procedural requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act. Also, the fact that Bellonio served
notices upon the attorney general and the airport
director, in addition to the Salt Lake City Attorney and
Kern, indicates an understanding that service upon
Kern alone would not be sufficient. (FN3)
Finally, unlike the facts in Bischel, Kern was never
the agent, apparently or in fact, of the mayor or the city
council. While the Salt Lake Airport Authority is not a
political subdivision, but rather a division of Salt Lake
City Corporation, it is certainly not the governing body
of Salt Lake City nor the agent of the mayor or the city
council. Therefore, unlike the plaintiff in Bischel,
Bellonio never even attempted to direct his notice of
claim to the proper party, i.e., the mayor or the city
council.
[6] Accordingly, we conclude that Bellonio did not
properly file his notice of claim and, therefore, his
claim is barred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993).
Since a notice of claim is a statutory prerequisite to
suit the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear
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Bellonio's case and erred by allowing him to proceed.
Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 540.
CONCLUSION
Because Bellonio did not file the required notice of
claim with the Salt Lake City Mayor or the Salt Lake
City Council within one year, as required by Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993), his claim is barred.
Therefore, the trial court was without jurisdiction to
allow his claim to proceed. Accordingly, we reverse
the decision of the trial court and remand for an entry
of judgment dismissing Bellonio's action with
prejudice.
DAVIS, Associate P.J., concurs.
ORME, P.J., concurs in result.
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(FN1.) The City argues the notices of claim were also
deficient in other regards and did not meet the
formal requirements of section 63-30-11(3).
However, due to our disposition of this case on the
issue of improper service, we do not reach this
issue.
(FN2.) Section 10-1-104(2) states: " 'Governing
body' means collectively the legislative body and
the executive of anv municipality." Utah Code
Ann. §10-1-104(2)(1992).
(FN3.) We note that this shotgun approach to servicepeppering the valley with notices of claim and
hoping one will hit close to the mark—is an
unsatisfactory way of assuring compliance with the
statute. While such a strategy may often result in
giving notice in fact, as the present case illustrates,
it does not guarantee compliance with the
Governmental Immunity Act.
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*275 907P.2d275
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Caren BISCHEL, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Heather J. MERRITT and Salt Lake County, et
al., Defendants
and Appellees.
No. 940559-CA.
Nov. 30, 1995.
Motorist sued county, alleging that she suffered
personal injuries in automobile accident caused by
county employee. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, J. Dennis Frederick, J., granted county's
motion to dismiss due to plaintiffs failure to file notice
of claim in accordance with Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Jackson, J., held that notice of claim was
sufficient, even though it was addressed to county
attorney, rather than to county commission.
Reversed and remanded.
Bench, J., issued dissenting opinion.
West Headnotes
[1] Judgment <S=^384
228 —
228IX Opening or Vacating
228k384 Form and Requisites of Application in
General.
Where plaintiff labeled her motion to set aside trial
court's order of dismissal as motion for new trial, but
where plaintiff filed that motion more than ten days
after entry of judgment because she did not receive
timely notice of judgment, trial court properly
considered motion as one for relief from judgment.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 59,60.
[2] Motions <©=> 15
267 —
267k 12 Form and Requisites
267kl 5 Entitling.
It is substantive motion, not caption, that is
controlling.
[3] Appeal and Error <@^982(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court
30k982 Vacating Judgment or Order
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30k982(l) In General.
[See headnote text below]
[3] Judgment <®^355
228 —
228IX Opening or Vacating
228k353 Errors and Irregularities
228k355 Errors of Law.
Trial courts have discretion to determine whether
mistake of law existed, and whether setting aside of
judgment would thus be warranted and Court of
Appeals will reverse only if there has been abuse of
that discretion. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b).
[4] Counties <@=>213
104 —
104X11 Actions
104k211 Conditions Precedent
104k213 Presentation of Claim.
Plaintiffs notice of claim to recover for personal
injury she sustained in automobile accident caused by
county employee satisfied requirements of Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, even though notice of
claim was addressed to county attorney, rather than to
county commission; statute was generally silent about
how notice should be filed with governing body, both
county commission and county attorney informed
plaintiff that notice should be filed with county
attorney, notice was timely, and filing notice with
county attorney facilitated settlement discussions.
U.C.A.1953,60-30-13.
[5] Municipal Corporations ®^741.10
268 —
268X11 Torts
268XII(A) Exercise of Governmental and
Corporate Powers in
General
268k741 Notice or Presentation of Claims
for Injury
268k741.10 In General.
Utah courts have established rule of strict
compliance with notice provisions of Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. U.C.A.1953,60-30-13.
*276 Samuel King and Harold J. Dent, Jr., Salt
Lake City, for Appellant.
Douglas R. Short, Salt Lake County Attorney, and
Michael E. Postma, Deputy County Attorney, Salt Lake
City, for Appellees.
Before ORME, P.J., and BENCH and JACKSON,
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JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Judge:
Caren Bischel appeals the trial court's denial of her
motion to set aside an order dismissing her personal
injury7 action. Salt Lake County prevailed below on its
motion to dismiss Bischel's action for failure to file a
notice of claim in accordance with the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
On February 1, 1993, Heather J. Merritt, a Salt
Lake County employee, caused an automobile accident
in which Bischel was allegedly injured. On April 22.
1993, Bischel prepared a notice of claim pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1993) and called the Salt
Lake County Commission to determine how and with
whom the notice of claim should be filed. Bischel was
told to send the notice to Trish McDonald at the Salt
Lake County Attorney's Office. Bischel then called
McDonald who confirmed the instructions and
provided the proper address for the notice. Bischel
sent the notice by certified mail and received a return
receipt signed by McDonald.
McDonald and other county employees
subsequently negotiated the claim with Bischel. In
May 1993, the county issued a $680 check for property
damage to Bischel's vehicle. By January 1994,
however, Bischel's personal injury claim had not been
settled, and she filed the present action. Salt Lake
County then moved to dismiss Bischel's lawsuit for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting the claim
was not preserved as required by the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-13 (1993). The County based its motion to
dismiss on the single fact that Bischel's notice of claim
was addressed to McDonald rather than to the County
Commission.
[1] The trial court granted the County's motion.
The County, however, failed to give Bischel timely
notice of the entry of judgment.
See Utah
R.Jud.Admin. 4-504(4) (1995). Once she received the
trial court's *277 order of dismissal, Bischel filed a
motion to set aside that order. (FN1) Bischel now
challenges the trial court's denial of her rule 60(b)
motion.

[2][3] Bischel argues the trial court abused its
discretion wheu it failed to recognize a mistake and set
aside its order. The County responds the trial court
made no mistake of law and therefore did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to set aside its original order of
dismissal. Rule 60(b)(1) provides a trial court may
relieve a party' of a judgment in case of mistake. (FN2)
A judicial error or "mistake of law by the trial court
may support a Rule 60(b) motion." Udy v. Udy, 893
P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah App. 1995). Trial courts have
discretion to determine whether a mistake of law
existed, and we will reverse only if there has been an
abuse of that discretion. Id. Under the facts of the
present case, we conclude a mistake of law existed;
therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied Bischel's rule 60(b) motion.
[4] The Utah Governmental Immunity Act
provides that
[a]ny person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity, or against an employee for an
act or omission occurring during the performance
of his duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority shall file written notice of
claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim ILS characterized as governmental.

... The notice of claim shall be ... directed and
delivered to the responsible governmental entity
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12
or 63-30-13.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (1993) (emphasis
added). The requirements of section 63-30-13 simply
provide that
[a] claim against a political subdivision, or against
its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is
barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
governing body of the political subdivision within
one year after the claim arises.
Id. § 63-30-13 (emphasis added). Under these
sections, plaintiffs must give timely notice to the
governing body of a county to maintain an action
against that county.

NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENT
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It is undisputed that Bischel sent a certified notice
of claim to the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office and
that the County Attorney's Office accepted that notice.
The trial court concluded Bischel's formal complaint
was barred because Bischel failed to file a proper
notice of claim in compbance with the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act.
To determine the
accuracy of the trial court's legal conclusion, we must
determine what filing a notice of claim with the
governing body practically requires of citizens with
claims against political subdivisions of the state. See
Brittain v. State ex rel Utah Dep't of Employment
*278 Sea, 882 P.2d 666, 669-70 (Utah App 1994).
(FN3)
The statute does not prescribe a specific manner or
method for filing notice with the governing body of the
political subdivision. Whereas requirements for the
form and content of the notice of claim are specifically
articulated in the statute, see Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-11(3) (1993), requirements for direction and
delivery of the notice must be inferred from the phrase,
"notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the
political subdivision within one year after the claim
arises." Id. §63-30-13. In other words, although the
time requirement is clearly expressed, the statute is
generally silent about how notice should be filed with
the governing body. Furthermore, the County has not
articulated any policy or specific procedure for citizens
to file notice of civil claims.
Because the statute does not prescribe specific
procedures for direction and delivery of the notice of
claim, we will interpret section 63-30-13 "in a manner
consistent with the overall purpose of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act." (FN4) Brittain, 882
P.2d at 670, "It is necessary to consider the policy of
the notice requirement so that in any particular case the
facts can be evaluated to determine if the intent of the
statute has been accomplished...." Stahl v. Utah
Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480,482 (Utah 1980).
"[T]he primary purpose of a notice of claim
requirement is to afford the responsible public
authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and
timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to
arrive at a timely settlement if appropriate, thereby
avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for
costly and unnecessary litigation."
Brittain, 882 P.2d at 671 (quoting Stahl, 618 P.2d
at 482).
Filing notice "tends to minimize the
difficulties that may arise due to changes in
administrations" and "protects against the passage of

time obscuring memory and distorting a plaintiffs
recollection of the events which are at the heart of the
claim." Id. at 671.
In the present case, Bischel, not finding explicit
instructions in the statute but wanting to ensure her
notice was directed and delivered correctly, called the
County Commission and was instructed to send the
notice to Trish McDonald in the County Attorney's
office. Bischel took the further step of confirming the
County Commission's instruction with McDonald.
McDonald agreed she was the proper person to receive
the notice and even provided the address where the
notice should be filed. Thus, McDonald verified her
apparent authority to receive the notice on behalf of the
County Commission.
McDonald's instruction to Bischel was certainly
reasonable given that the County Attorney's staff
investigates and negotiates civil claims against the
County. Bischel had no reason to question such a
sensible instruction. Bischel's notice enabled the
County to investigate the claim and to move toward
settlement. Bischel's notice also memorialized the
events at the heart of her claim. Bischel thus fulfilled
the purpose of the notice requirement by filing notice
of her claim with the designated person in the County
Attorney's Office.
Considering the duties and authority delegated to
the County Attorney's Office, it is evident that the
governmental entity entrusted with investigating and
settling or defending the claim received the requisite
notice well within the one-year period imposed by the
statute. Directing and delivering her notice of claim to
the County Attorney's Office in no way inhibited
settling Bischel's claim without resort to litigation. In
fact, given the powers and responsibilities the County
has bestowed upon the County Attorney's *279
Office, the opposite is true. See id. at 672. Filing
notice with the County Attorney's Office facilitated
settlement discussions. Indeed, the County Attorney's
Office actively pursued settlement of Bischel's claim,
even paying her property damage.
[5] Utah courts have established a rule of strict
compbance with the notice provisions of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. See, e.g., Yates v.
Vernal Family Health Ctr., 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah
1980); Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't ofTransp., 828
P.2d 535, 541 (Utah App. 1992). Our holding today is
consistent with that rule. The present case is not one in
which a plaintiff gave no notice, see, e.g., Madsen v.
Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah 1983), or in which
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a plaintiff filed only one of the two required notices,
see, e.g., Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 540-41. This case is
also not one in which the notice of claim was defective
in form or content, see, e.g., Cox v. Utah Mortgage &
Loan Corp., 716 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1986), or in
which notice of claim was not filed within the one-year
period see, e.g., Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276,
277 (Utah 1985) (per curiam). As required by the
statute, Bischel gave the County notice of claim;
Bischel's notice complied with the statute's form and
content requirements; and Bischel's notice was timely
filed. Bischel therefore strictly complied with the
statute and with the County Commission's instructions.
In sum, because Bischel directed and delivered her
notice precisely as instructed by the statute and the
County Commission, her notice was adequate. Further,
because her notice and the ensuing lawsuit were timely
filed, the trial court's refusal to set aside its dismissal
must be reversed.
Bischel must be given the
opportunity to pursue her claim. (FN5) It appears at
best disingenuous for the County to argue that Bischel's
notice was inadequate merely because she directed and
delivered it as the County Commission and County
Attorney's Office instructed. The public deserves more
consistent, more credible treatment from its servants.
CONCLUSION
We hold that Bischel's notice of claim met the
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
We therefore conclude the trial court abused its
discretion when it failed to find a mistake of law under
rule 60(b)(1) and denied Bischel's motion to set aside
its earlier judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial
court's order and remand the matter for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ORME, P.J., concurs.
BENCH. Judge (dissenting):
Had Bischel filed a timely appeal from the
judgment of dismissal, we would have to reach the
issue of whether she filed a timely notice of claim with
"the governing body" as required by Utah Code Ann. §
63-30-13 (1993). However, Bischel didnol appeal the
judgment of dismissal. She appeals only the denial of
her post-judgment motion. See main opinion at notes 1
and 2.
"The trial court is afforded broad discretion in
ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under Utah
RXiv.P. 60(b), and its determination will not be
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disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Birch v.
Birch, 111 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App.1989). Insofar
as Bischel's post-judgment motion can be construed to
be a 60(b) motion, the trial court acted within its
discretion in denying the motion. To hold otherwise is
to effectively allow a 60(b) motion to stay the time for
appealing the underlying judgment. Utah courts have
consistently held that a 60(b) motion does not stay the
time for appealing a judgment. Lord v. lx>rd, 709 P.2d
338, n. 1 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (stating that "[r]ule
60(b) motions do not toll the time for appeal"); Peay
v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841, 842 (Utah 1980) (explaining
that rule 60(b) motion does not extend time for filing
notice of appeal); Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d
120, 122 n. 2, 466 P.2d 843, 845 n. 2 (1970) (same);
Anderson v. Anderson, 3 Utah 2d 277, 280, 282 P.2d
845,847 (1955) (same); see also Utah R.App.P. 4(b).
*280
In her post-judgment motion. Bischel
reargued and restated the same arguments she had
made in opposing the motion to dismiss. No new
information was provided, nor were any new
arguments made. The trial court held that Bischel
"failed to articulate sufficient reasons justifying relief,"
and denied the post-judgment motion. That ruling is
within the broad discretion of the trial court.
Even if we could get beyond the procedural defect
discussed above, the main opinion fails to follow
controlling precedent in discussing the merits of the
case. The main opinion erroneously relies upon
Brittain v. State, 882 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1994) to
divine the meaning of the "governing body" provision
of section 63-30-13. Brittain, however, involved a
different statute.
In Brittain, Ihe plaintiff had been injured at a Job
Service building in Provo, Utah. This court was
interpreting section 63-30-12, which requires notice to
be filed with the Attorney General's office and the
"agency concerned" in any action against the state. The
plaintiff properly served notice upon the Attorney
General's office but instead of also serving notice upon
Job Service or the Division of Facilities Construction
and Management, the plaintiff sent notice to the
Division of Risk Management. At trial, the State
succeeded on its motion to dismiss for failure to file
notice with the 'agency concerned," and the plaintiff
appealed. To interpret "agency concerned," this court
relied on the dictionary definition of "concerned" as
including those who are "interested."
The court
concluded that "interested" included the Division of
Risk Management since it ultimately handled such
claims. Id. at 671.
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However, this type of interpretation is
inappropriate in construing the "governing body"
provision of section 63-30-13. In construing that
section, the Utah Supreme Court has previously
indicated that the governing body of a county is the
county commission. Yates v. Vernal Family Health
Ctr., 617 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 1980). In Yates, the
supreme court expressly held that a complaint against a
county was properly dismissed because plaintiff did not
give timely notice to the county commission. Id.
Bischel did not serve any notice on the Salt Lake
County Commission. Bischel also failed to establish,
by competent evidence, that she had followed the
county commission's instructions as to how to file a
notice of claim. She presented no sworn statement
from a member of the county commission or any
employee of the commission. She did not even secure
a sworn statement from Trish McDonald. (FN1)
Merely claiming that some unidentified person told her
where and how to file her claim is not enough to
withstand the strict filing requirements of the
Governmental Immunity7 Act. See Lamarr v. Utah
State Dep't of Transp., %2% P.2d 535, 540-41 (Utah
App.1992). Bischel has failed to meet her burden of
showing that the county commission, in some way,
waived those strict notice requirements.
Implicit in the main opinion's decision is that
because of what an unidentified commission employee
allegedly told Bischel's attorney, the county
commission should now be estopped from holding
Bischel to the strict requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act. It is, however, very difficult to estop
the government. See Utah State Univ. v. Sutro & Co.,
646 P.2d 715, 720 (Utah 1982). Only "wellsubstantiated representations" by a governmental entity
will suffice. Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 839
P.2d 822, 828 (Utah 1992). To estop a governmental
entity, its representations must generally take the form
of a written statement by an authorized person. Id. at
827; Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
Comm'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694-95 (Utah 1979);
Eldredge v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 795 P.2d 671,
675-76 (Utah App. 1990).
There is clearly no written statement in this case.
Bischel has not even identified the commission
employee who allegedly told her to file her notice with
the county attorney. Under those circumstances, the
county commission cannot be estopped from holding
Bischel *281. to the strict notice provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act.
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For the foregoing reasons. I would affirm.
(FN1.) We note that Bischel labeled her motion to set
aside the trial court's order of dismissal as being
made pursuant to rules 59 and 60 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, Bischel filed the
motion more than ten days after entry of judgment
because she did not receive timely notice of the
judgment from the County'. The trial court thus
properly considered the motion under rule 60 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than under
rule 59. See Utah R.Ch.P. 59; Fackrell v.
Fackrell, 740 P.2d 1318, 1319 (Utah 1987) (Rule
59 motions must be made within ten days after
entry ofjudgment).
(FN2.) Although Bischel labeled her motion as a rule
60(b)(7) motion, it is the substance of the motion,
not the caption that is controlling. State v. Parker,
872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); Kunzler v. O'Dell,
855 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, the
trial court should have treated the motion as a rule
60(b)(1) motion rather than a rule 60(b)(7) motion
because the substance of the motion challenged the
trial court's definition of "strict compliance"
required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Furthermore, the trial court should have treated the
motion as falling under rule 60(b)(1) because that
subsection benefited Bischel. See Parker, 872 P.2d
at 1044 n. 3 (noting court should choose rule 60
subsection that most benefits party seeking relief).
Additionally, Bischel filed her motion within the
three-month time frame required by rule 60(b)( 1).
(FN3.) In dissent. Judge Bench asserts our reliance on
Bhttain is erroneous because Brittam interpreted a
different statute. Indeed, Bhttain focused on
section 63-30-12 rather than on section 63-30-13.
However, the two sections are identical in thenrequirements for directing and delivering notice of
claim. The basic difference between the two
sections is that section 63-30-12 addresses claims
against the state while section 63-30-13 addresses
claims against political subdivisions of the state.
(FN4.) For brief discussions of how the doctrine of
governmental immunity evolved, see Condemarin
v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 349-51 (Utah
1989), and Bhttain, 882 P.2d at 668-69.
(FN5.) We have also reviewed Bischel's claim for
costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal. We
deny the claim, finding it without merit. See State
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989)
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(observing court may decline to address arguments
without merit on appeal).
(FNl.) Bischel's attorney merely alleged that an
unidentified receptionist told him to file a notice
with McDonald in the county attorney's office. In
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an affidavit the Chief Deputy of the Government
Services Division of the county attorney's office
stated that Trish McDonald was not authorized to
accept notices of claim on behalf of the county
commission.
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Claimant brought tort suit against state. The
District Court Utah County. Lynn W. Davis. J.,
dismissed complaint and appeal was taken. The Court
of Appeals, Orme, Associate P.J., held that claimant
had satisfied requirement that notice be given to "the
concerned agency," by filing notice and proper form
with Department of Risk Management even though
claimant had not filed notice with Job Service or
Division of Facilities Construction and Management
agencies claimed to be at fault.
Reversed and remanded.
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complaint as true, and considers those facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in light most
favorable to plaintiff.
[3] Appeal and Error <@=*842(1)
30 —
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether
Questions Are of Law or
of Fact
30k842(l) In General.
Trial court's interpretation of statute is legal
conclusion reviewed for correctness, according no
particular deference to trial court.
[4] States @=> 197
360 —
360 VI Actions
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action
Against State
360k 197 Presentation of Claim.
Strict compliance with notice requirement has
typically been necessary7 to maintain tort action against
state under Governmental Immunity- Act. U.C.A.1953,
63-30-1 to 63-30-38.
[5] States®^ 197
360 —
360 VI Actions
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action
Against State
360kl97 Presentation of Claim.
State Division of Risk Management could be "the
agency concerned" for purposes of Governmental
Immunity Act requirement that notice of claim be filed
upon "the agency concerned," even though Immunity
Act went into effect in 1966 and Department was not
created until 1981; powers and responsibilities
conferred on Department were sufficient to qualify it as
a concerned agency. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-11,63-30-12
,63A-4-101to63A-4-206.
[6] Statutes <©^214
361 —
361VI Construction and Operation
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction
361k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction
361k214 In General.
In interpreting statute, court first examines its plain
language and will resort to other methods of statutory
interpretation only if court determines that language is
ambiguous.
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360 —
360 VI Actions
360kl94 Conditions Precedent to Action Against
State
360k 197 Presentation of Claim.
Term "agency concerned" employed in
Governmental Immunity Act requirement that "agency
concerned" be given notice of tort claim, was not clear
on its face, requiring appellate court to interpret
requirement in manner consistent with overall purpose
of Act; there could be more than one agency
responsible for injury, and term was not necessarily
limited to those having fault responsibility.
U.C.A.1953,63-30-12.
[8] States <©=> 197
360 —
360 VI Actions
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action
Against State
360k 197 Presentation of Claim.
Primary purpose of notice of claim requirement, in
connection with suits against state, is to afford
responsible public authorities opportunity to pursue
proper and timely investigation of merits of claim and
to arrive at timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby
avoiding expenditure of public revenue for costly and
unnecessary7 litigation. U.C.A.1953.63-30-12.
[9] States®^ 197
360 —
360 VI Actions
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action
Against State
360k 197 Presentation of Claim.
"The agency concerned." as used in statute
requiring that notice of tort claims against state be filed
with "the agency concerned," refers to an any agency
with legitimate interests in claim and legal proceedings
which might result therefrom. U.C.A.1953,63-30-12.
[10] States @=* 197
360 —
360 VI Actions
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action
Against State
360kl97 Presentation of Claim.
Tort claimant had satisfied requirement, of
Governmental Immunity Act, that notice of claim be
filed with "the agency concerned," by filing notice with
the Department of Risk Management, even though
other agencies were alleged to have caused injuries;
Department was empowered to handle claims on
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behalf of state, and was to receive notice of claims
served on other agencies. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-12,
63A-4-101 to 63A-4-206;
Utah Admin.Code
R37-1-1.
[11] States <§==>197
360 —
360 VI Actions
360k 194 Conditions Precedent to Action
Against State
360k 197 Presentation of Claim.
Receipt of actual notice of claim does not satisfy
requirement that tort claimant notify- "the agency
concerned" as required by the Governmental Immunity
Act. U.C.A.1953.63-30-12.
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for appellees.
Before DAVIS, JACKSON and ORME, JJ.
OPINION
ORME, Associate Presiding Judge:
Harold Brittain appeals the trial court's order
dismissing his ipersonal injury claim for failure to file
notice in accordance with the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. We reverse and remand.
FACTS
On February 4, 1991, Brittain was injured when he
fell down some icy steps at the Department of
Employment Security (Job Service) in Provo, Utah.
Shortly after the. accident James Christiansen, a claims
adjuster and investigator, contacted Brittain and
indicated he would be handling the claim on behalf of
Job Service and the Utah Division of Risk
Management. 'On March 11, 1991, Brittain, through
his attorney, filed notice of his claim with both the
attorney general and the Division of Risk Management.
Brittain alleged that melting snow had dripped off the
roof of the building and frozen on the steps, that the
Division of Facilities Construction and Management
(DFCM) was negligent in approving the design and
construction of the building, and that both DFCM and
Job Service were negligent in maintaining the building
and its premises. Christiansen met with Brittain's
attorney on March 12, 1991, to discuss settling
Brittain's claim. From mid-April through the end of
August of 1991, those discussions continued. During
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that time, Christiansen sent Brittain's attorney six
separate letters reaffirming that he was acting as an
agent on behalf of Job Service and Risk Management.
The settlement discussions failed and Brittain, having
sent timely notice of his claim to both the Utah
Attorney General and Risk Management, filed this
action.
On June 4, 1992, after fifteen months of settlement
discussion and extensive discovery, and only four days
before the case was to be tried, the State filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that Brittain had failed to file
notice of claim with either Job Service or DFCM as
required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1993 &
Supp.1994). The trial court, ruling from the bench,
granted the State's motion, reasoning that filing notice
of claim with Risk Management did not fulfill the
necessary requirement of filing notice with "the agency
concerned." Id. § 63-30-12. Brittain appeals from this
order.
ISSUE
The sole issue presented is whether, given the facts
of this case, the trial court erred by concluding that
Brittain's serving notice of claim upon Risk
Management did not constitute service upon the agency
concerned as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12
(1993).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1][2][3] We will uphold a trial court's grant of a
motion to dismiss "only where it clearly appears that
the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief
under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they
could prove to support their claim." Prows v. State,
822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991). On appeal, we accept
the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and consider
those facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, in a light most favorable to plaintiff.
Demondv. FHP, 849 P.2d 598, 599 (Utah App. 1993).
Key to our decision is the interpretation of the statute
imposing a notice requirement as a prerequisite to
bringing an action against the State. The trial court's
interpretation of a statute is a legal conclusion which
we review for correctness, according no particular
deference to the trial court. Jerz v. Salt Lake County,
822 P.2d 770,771 (Utah 1991).
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
The doctrine of sovereign or

governmental
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immunity—requiring the consent of the State in order to
subject it to suit in its own courts—is a deeph rooted
and well recognized *669
doctrine of American
common law. See Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627,
629 (Utah 1983). The doctrine is a cam over from
medieval times, and reflects the notion that the
sovereign, in whom reposed ultimate governmental
powers, was simply incapable of doing wrong. (FN 1)
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, see Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1993 & Supp.1994), which
went into effect in 1966, codified the common law
principle of sovereign immunity and created various
exceptions to the doctrine. Madsen, 658 P.2d at
629-30.
[4] Scores of Utah cases have interpreted this Act
and defined the requirements necessary to overcome
the State's immunity. (FN2) Among these many
cases, courts have, periodically, had occasion to
interpret the Act's notice requirements. See, e.g., Cox
v. Utah Mortgage & Loan Corp., 716 P.2d 783,
785-86 (Utah 1986); Madsen, 658 P.2d at 630; Sears
v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 193-94 (Utah 1977);
Scarborough v. Granite Sch. Dist., 531 P.2d 480, 482
(Utah 1975); Lamarrv. Department of Transp., 828
P.2d 535, 540-42 (Utah App. 1992); Kabwasa v.
University of Utah, 785 F.Supp. 1445, 1446-47
(D.Utah 1990). Strict compliance with the notice
requirement has typically been necessary to maintain
an action against the State. See Sears, 563 P.2d at 194;
Scarborough, 531 P.2d at 482. While defects in the
form or content of notices of claim do not always act to
bar a claim, see Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc.,
675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983); Spencer v. Salt
Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 363-64, 412 P.2d 449.450
(1966), courts have consistently barred claims in
situations where either no notice or only one of the two
required notices was filed. See Lamarr, 828 P.2d at
541; Kabwasa, 785 F.Supp. at 1446-47. However,
until now, no reported Utah decision has barred a claim
when two notices, free of defects, were timely filed.
Thus, this appeal presents an issue of first impression
and necessitates our careful review of the notice of
claim requirements within the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. See Utah Code Ann.§§ 63-30-11 to -13
(1993).
NOTICE OF CLAIM
The Governmental Immunity Act provides that
[a]ny person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity, or against an employee for an
act or omission occurring during the performance
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of his duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority shall file written notice of
claim with the entity before maintaining an action,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise
to the claim is characterized as governmental....
The notice of claim shall be ... directed and
delivered to the responsible governmental entity
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12
or 63-30-13.

A claim against the state, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring during
the performance of his duties, w ithin the scope of
employment or under color of authority, is barred
unless notice of claim is filed with the attorney

general and the agency concerned within one year
after the claim arises ....
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -12 (1993)
(emphasis added).
[5] Under these sections, a plaintiff must give
timely notice to both the attorney general and "the
agency concerned" in order to maintain an action
against the State.
Neither party disputes that
appropriate notice was sent to the attorney general. It
is also undisputed that notice was sent to the Division
of Risk Management within one year after the claim
arose. The trial court found that such notice was
deficient because it concluded Risk Management was
not "the agency concerned" within the meaning of
section 60-30-12. To assess the accuracy of this
conclusion we must determine what the Legislature,
*670 in promulgating section 63-30-12, intended to
include within the term "the agency concerned." (FN3)
A. Serving Notice on the Agency Concerned
[6] To interpret a statute, we first examine its plain
language and will resort to other methods of statutory
interpretation only if we determine that the language is
ambiguous. State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah
1992); Krauss v. Department of Transp., 852 P.2d
1014, 1018 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 862 P.2d 1356
(Utah 1993). The State contends that serving notice on
"the agency concerned" plainly requires serving notice
on the agency allegedly at fault for the claimant's
injuries. However, the Legislature chose not to employ
fault-based terminology into the notice requirement of
section 63-30-12; instead, it employed the more
nebulous and far broader language of "the agency
concerned." If the Legislature had intended to require
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a claimant to serve notice on the agency allegedly at
fault it would have used different language, perhaps
requiring that notice be sent to the agency that would
have been liable if it were a private party. (FN4)
[7] Moreover, the Legislature's decision to employ
singular usage and require notice to nthe agency
concerned* is inconsistent with a fault-based scheme.
Unlike the imprecise word "concerned," fault is a more
technical concept and fault is frequently shared by
multiple parties. If fault were at the heart of
determining to whom notice should be sent, singular
usage would be; avoided and the statute would clearly
require that in cases, like the instant one, where two or
more agencies are claimed to be at fault, more than two
notices of claim would be required—one to the attorney
general and an additional notice of claim to every
agency which might be at fault. However, the State
does not contend, nor do the statute or prior cases
suggest, that more than two notices are ever required.
(FN5)
Because the term "agency concerned" is not clear
on its face, we will interpret the notice requirement of
section 63-30-12 in a manner consistent with the
overall purpose of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court. "[i]t is
necessary to (xmsider the policy of the notice
requirement so 1hat in any particular case the facts can
be evaluated to determine if the intent of the statute has
been accomplished." *671 Stahl v. Utah Transit
Auth., 618 P.2d 480,482 (Utah 1980).
B. Purpose of Notice
[8] "[T]he primary purpose of a notice of claim
requirement is to afford the responsible public
authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and
timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to
arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby
avoiding the expenditure of public revenue for costly
and unnecessary litigation." (FN6) Stahl v. Utah
Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980). See
Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1977);
Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 364, 412
P.2d 449, 450 (1966). Serving notice on the attorney
general is intended to ensure that the State's legal needs
are met. (FN7) See Lamarr v. Department of
Transp., 828 P.2d 535, 541 n. 6 (Utah App.1992).
Furthermore, filing notice of claim tends to minimize
the difficulties that may arise due to changes in
administrations. Sears, 563 P.2d at 193. Lastly, the
requirement thai the notice be in writing protects
against the passage of time obscuring memory and
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distorting a plaintiffs recollection of the events which
are at the heart of the claim. (FN8) See Stahl, 618
P.2dat482.

and settlement shall be exclusively with the Risk
Management Fund."
Utah Admin.Code R37-1-1
(1994) (emphasis added).

[9] Having ascertained the purposes of the notice
requirement we next must establish a working
definition of the term "agency concerned" in order to
evaluate the adequacy of notice in this case. Because
the term "agency concerned" is not defined by statute,
we turn to its commonly understood meaning. The
word "concerned" is defined as meaning "interested."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 470
(1976). Thus, the statute's requirement that plaintiff
must file notice of claim with "the agency concerned"
is met by filing notice with any one of potentially
several agencies with a legitimate interest in plaintiffs
claim and the legal proceedings which might result
therefrom.

Given this broad-based authority, it cannot be
seriously argued that Brittain's claim did not directly
and fundamentally concern Risk Management. On the
contrary, Risk Management's responsibility and
involvement were substantial. Therefore, we can only
conclude that Risk Management had a legitimate
interest in plaintiffs claim and, by definition, qualified
as an "agency concerned."

ADEQUACY OF NOTICE IN THIS CASE
[10] We now assess Brittain's contention that the
notice he filed with Risk Management in this case
constituted compliance with section 63-30-12 in light
of both the broad language of that section and the
aforementioned policy considerations.
A. Risk Management is Agency Concerned
The duties of Risk Management mandate it take an
active role in Brittain's claim and clearly suggest it is
an agency concerned.
To begin with, Risk
Management is authorized by law to handle Brittain's
claim, representing the interests of the State. Risk
Management is empowered with broad-based authority
to handle claims on behalf of the State. See Utah Code
Ann. §§ 63A-4-101 to -206 (1993); Utah Admin.Code
R37-1-1 to -5 (1994). The Legislature has authorized
Risk Management to "adjust, settle, and pay claims."
Utah Code Ann. § 63A-4-102(l)(c) *672 (1993).
Directly relevant to the case at bar, if suit is brought
against a state agency pursuant to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act the agency shall
immediately forward to Risk Management any notice
of claim it receives. Utah Admin.Code R37-1-3(B)
(1994). The risk manager is also required to supervise
the state-funded risk management fund. Utah Code
Ann. § 63A-4-201(l)(a) (1993). This fund is used to
pay all costs authorized by the risk manager relating to
property, liability, fidelity and other risks. Id. §
63A-4-201(l)(b). Moreover, "[i]n managing and
defending claims against covered entities, the Risk
Management Fund will consider their interests, but the
final determination as to claim management defense

B. Purpose of Providing Notice was Met
[11] Moreover, Brittain fulfilled the purposes of
section 63-30-12 by filing notice of his claim with the
attorney general and Risk Management.
(FN9)
Considering the duties delegated to Risk Management,
it appears the state entity entrusted with investigating
and settling or defending the claim received the
requisite notice in a timely manner and well within the
one-year period imposed by the statute. Filing notice
with Risk Management in no way inhibited the
possibility of settling the claim without resort to
litigation. In fact, given the powers and responsibilities
the Legislature has bestowed upon Risk Management,
the opposite is true.
Filing notice with Risk
Management facilitated settlement discussions by
providing notice to the agency responsible for
investigating and settling the claim and obviated the
risk that Job Service or DFCM would fail to forward
the notice to Risk Management as required by law. See
Utah Admin Code. R37-1-3(B) (1994). Indeed, the
record indicates that Risk Management actively
pursued settling Brittain's claim.
Finally, we wish to reiterate that this is not a case
where the notice of claim was defective in form or
content. (FN 10) Recognizing the need for written
notice to protect against the unreliability of memory,
the notice of claim was preserved in writing, accurately
recording Brittain's account of the accident. This is
also not a case where plaintiff either gave no notice or
filed only one of the two required notices. (FN11)
Here, plaintiff filed two *673. notices, one with the
attorney general and the other with Risk Management.
Finally, this is not a case where notice of claim was not
filed within the one-year period. (FN 12) It is
undisputed that plaintiff sent both notices well within
one year from the date his claim arose.
CONCLUSION
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Given the facts of the case before us and the powers
the Legislature has bestowed upon Risk Management,
we conclude that Brittain filed notice of claim on an
agency concerned by filing notice with Risk
Management. Therefore, the trial court erred in
concluding that Brittain failed to comply with section
63-30-12 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for trial on the
merits.
DAVIS and JACKSON, JJ., concur.
(FN1.) This underlying premise has, of course, long
since been rejected.
Indeed, the American
Revolution resulted from the perception of most
American colonists that the British sovereign had
perpetrated any number of wrongs. See The
Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
(FN2.) A brief recap of how this doctrine evolved can
be found in Condemarin v. University Hospital
115 P.2d 348, 349-51 (Utah 1989).
(FN3.) The State contends that because the current
version of section 63-30-12 was enacted in 1965
and went into effect in 1966, the requirement of
filing notice with the agency concerned could not
have been meant to refer to Risk Management,
which was not created until 1981. However, when
Risk Management was created, the Legislature gave
it powers and responsibilities that suggest it can
readily fit within the term "agency concerned" for
purposes of section 63-30-12. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63A-4-101 to -206 (1993) (defining powers and
duties of Risk Management). See also Utah
Admin.Code R37-1-1 to -5 (1994) (administrative
rules establishing policies and procedures of Risk
Management). We should assume that when the
Legislature created Risk Management it did so
advisedly, fully aware of the impact this would have
on existing law. See Greenhalgh v. Payson City,
530 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1975). See alsoAdkins v.
Division of State Lands, 719 P.2d 524, 525-26
(Utah 1986) (holding plaintiff need not file notice
in accordance with section 63-30-12 because
Division of State Lands had statutory authority to
decide dispute prior to the creation and enactment
of the Governmental Immunity Act).
(FN4.) See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(1)
(1993) (providing that "[a] claim [against the
State] arises when the statute of limitations that
would apply if the claim were against a private
person begins to run"). See also Utah Code Ann. §
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63-30-4(1 )(b) (1993) (providing that if the State
waives its immunity from suit "consent to be sued
is granted, and liability of the entity shall be
determined as if the entity were a private person").
(FN5.) In the instant case, Brittain alleges that the
Division
of
Facilities
Construction
and
Management (DFCM) was negligent in approving
the design and construction of the building, and that
both DFCM and Job Service were negligent in
maintaining the building and its premises. Thus,
Brittain claims that while DFCM is responsible for
creating the dangerous condition, both DFCM and
Job Service? share the blame for allowing the
dangerous condition to remain. Under the State's
fault-oriented view, no reason exists why Brittain
would not be required to file three notices of
claim—one with the attorney general, one with the
DFCM. and one with Job Service. Nonetheless, the
statute contemplates that only two notices be sent
and the State does not contend otherwise in this
appeal.
(FN6.) In the instant case, this purpose was fully
accomplished well in advance of any notice being
given. Within days of this accident, the sovereign's
agent contacted plaintiff and, with commendable
responsibility, set about to investigate what
happened and to settle the claim without need for
litigation. The main purpose of the statute having
been met, this appeal is reduced to evaluating
whether plaintiff has abided by the technical
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act—a statute with which plaintiffs must strictly
comply in order to overcome the State's immunity.
(FN7.) The Attorney General has a duty to "defend all
causes to which the state ... is a party." Utah Code
Ann. §67-5-l(l)(1993).
*673_
(FN8.) The Utah Supreme Court has
previously stated that the notice of claim
requirement is also intended to provide the State
with the opportunity to promptly remedy any defect
before additional injury occurs. See Sears v.
Southworth, 563 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1977).
However, the plain language of section 63-30-12 is
contrary to the notion that one of its purposes is to
allow for prompt remedial measures. Section
63-30-12 allows one year to file a notice of claim.
If the Legislature intended to require a notice of
claim to facilitate the prompt correction of
potentially dangerous defects or conditions, it
certainly would have required that plaintiff notify
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the State of the hazard in a far more expeditious
manner than anytime within one year of the
incident.

that Brittain notified Risk Management-the agency
concerned with investigating and settling or
defending the asserted claim.

For example, in the case before us. Brittain was
injured on February 4, 1991, when he slipped on
the ice at Job Service. He had one year to file
notice of claim with the State. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-30-12 (1993). The dangerous condition could
have remained for several more weeks, but in any
event it would certainly have melted away long
before the one-year period had expired.

(FN 10.) See, e.g., Cox v. Utah Mortgage & Loan
Corp., 716 P.2d 783, 786 (Utah 1986) (letter to
city council proposing city take legal action not
sufficient as notice of claim): Scarborough v.
Granite Sch. Dist., 531 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1975)
(school principal's submission of written report to
school district, although based on claimant's
conversation with principal, did not satisfy notice
requirement).

(FN9.) This court has previously stated "that actual
notice cannot cure a failure to comply with the
notice provisions of the Governmental Immunity
Act." Lamarr v. Department ofTransp., 828 P.2d
535, 541 (Utah App. 1992).
Although not
expressly stated in Lamarr, the rationale behind
this rule of strict compliance is clear—the purpose
of the notice of claim is not simply to provide
information about the facts of the incident that led
to the claim being asserted, which facts the affected
agencies may already know. Instead, the purpose
of the notice statute is to make the State aware that
a plaintiff actually intends to assert a claim. Such
notice allows the State to investigate and settle the
claim in advance of litigation being commenced.
Therefore, that Job Service immediately notified
Risk Management about Brittain's accident and that
both had actual notice of the incident at the heart of
Brittain's claim is not dispositive. What matters is

(FNll.) For example, in Lamarr v. Department of
Transportation, 828 P.2d 535 (Utah App. 1992),
the defect which barred plaintiffs claim was that
plaintiff did not file two written notices of claim. In
Lamarr, plaintiff served UDOT, but failed to serve
notice of claim on the attorney general. Id. at
540-41. Likewise, in Kabwasa v. University of
Utah, 785 F.Supp. 1445, 1446-47 (D.Utah 1990),
plaintiffs claim was barred because he served only
one of the two required notices. Finally, in Madsen
v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 628 (Utah 1983),
plaintiff failed to file any notice of claim with either
the attorney general or the agency concerned.
(FN12.) See Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276, 277
(Utah 1985) (per curiam); Sears v. Southworth,
563 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1977).
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*449 412P.2d449
17 Utah 2d 362
Supreme Court of Utah.
Frances SPENCER, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation of the
State of
Utah, Defendant and Respondent
No. 10485.
March 18, 1966.
Action to recover from city for injuries sustained
when plaintiff tripped on a defective sidewalk and fell.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Stewart M.
Hanson, J., granted city's motion to dismiss claim.
Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, McDonough,
J., held that claim against city which gave time, place,
and stated generally the nature of the alleged defect and
the injury was not rendered insufficient by its failure to
state the amount of damages claimed, since city was
given essential facts enabling it to make proper
investigation.
Dismissal vacated and case remanded for trial.
West Headnotes
[1] Municipal Corporations ©^755(1)
268 —
268X11 Torts
268XII(C) Defects or Obstructions in Streets
and Other Public Ways
268k755 Nature and Grounds of Liability
268k755(l) In General.
The city is liable for negligence in performing duty
of maintenance of streets and sidewalks. U.C.A.1953,
10-7-77.
[2] T i m e ® ^ 8
378 —
378k7 Days
378k8 In General.
Claim against city filed on July 27 for injuries
sustained on June 27 when plaintiff tripped on a
defective sidewalk was filed within 30 days allowed by
statute governing such suit. U.C.A.1953, 10-7-77.
[3] Municipal Corporations ®^812(6.1)
268 —
268X11 Torts
268XII(C) Defects or Obstructions in Streets

Pagel
and Other Public Ways
268k810 Actions for Injuries
268k812 Notice of Claim for Injun
268k812(6) Form and Sufficiency
268k812(6.1) In General.

(Formerly 268k812(6))
Claim against city for injuries sustained when
plaintiff tripped on defective sidewalk and fell, which
gave time, place, and stated generalh the nature of the
alleged defect and the injury, was not rendered
insufficient by its failure to state the amount of
damages claimed, since city was given the essential
facts which would enable it to make proper
investigation. U.C.A.1953, 10-7-77.
*450 [17 Utah 2d 363 J Thomas A. Duffin, Salt
Lake City, for appellant.
Homer Holmgren, City Atty.. A. M. Marsden, Asst.
City Atty., Salt Lake City, for respondent.
McDONOUGH, Justice:
Plaintiff Frances Spencer sued Salt Lake City
alleging that on the night of June 27. 1964. she suffered
injuries when she tripped and fell on a defective
sidewalk where tree roots had raised it about four to six
inches in front of 463 Douglas Street.
(1) Our statutes impose upon the City the duty of
maintenance of streets and sidewalks, and it is
established that the City is liable for negligence in
performing this duty; see Nyman v. Cedar City, 12
Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114. Section 10-7-77,
U.C.A.1953 provides that a person must file a claim
within 30 days after the injury.
At pre-trial the district court granted the City's
motion to dismiss on the ground (a) that the plaintiff
had not filed her claim within 30 days; and (b) that the
claim which was filed was insufficient in that it did not
state the amount of damages claimed.
(2) As to (a), it is alleged that the accident occurred
on June 27, 1964. The claim is dated July 25, 1964,
and was filed with the City Recorder on July 27, 1964.
This is within the 30 days allowed by the statute.
(3) As to (b): The claim gave the time, place and
stated generally the nature of the alleged defect and the
injury. Even if the fact that the amount of damages was
not stated be regarded as a defect, that [17 Utah 2d 364
J surely should not be considered as rendering the
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claim a complete nullity. There is a wide difference
between presenting no claim at all and presenting one
of the kind shown here which evidently fulfills the main
purpose of the statute: of giving the City the essential
facts as soon as reasonably possible after the injury so
that it will have ample opportunity to make a proper
investigation. See Hurley v. Town of Bingham. 63
Utah 589, 228 P. 213. In such circumstances as this it
is the duty of the court to look to substance rather than
to technicality in order that plaintiff may have a fair
adjudication of her claim. It seems unreasonable and
captious to deprive her entirety of that opportunity for
failing to specify the amount of damages she suffered
within 30 days of her injury when it is obvious that
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neither she nor anyone else would know just what those
figures were at that time.
Inasmuch as the plaintiff filed her claim within the
30 days allowed by statute, and the claim was sufficient
to constitute substantial *451. compliance with the
statute and apprise the City of the essentials thereof, it
is our opinion that the dismissal was in error. It is
vacated and the case remanded for trial. No costs
awarded.
HENRIOD, C. J., and CROCKETT, WADE, and
CALLISTER. JJ. concur.
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GREAT WEST CASUALTY Company, Ltoyd
Morris, and Judy K. Morris,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
and Does I-X,
Defendants and Appellees.
No. 20000010-CA
FILED: 02/23/01
2001UTApp54
Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Tyrone Medley
ATTORNEYS:
Preston L. Handy, Murray, and Michael F.
Richman, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Mark L. Shurtleffand Nancy L. Kemp, Salt Lake
City, for Appellees
Before Judges Jackson, Davis, and Orme.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
ORME, Judge:
11 Great West Casualty Company challenges the
trial court's grant of the Utah Department of
Transportation's motion for summary judgment,
premised on the inadequacy of notice under Utah's
sovereign immunity scheme. With some reluctance,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
12 The facts are undisputed. On October 20, 1997,
Lloyd Morns was driving a truck on Interstate SO
when he came upon a cow in the highway. He struck
the cow and rolled the truck. Both Lloyd and his wife
Judy, a passenger in the vehicle, were injured, and the
vehicle was damaged. The truck was owned by M&P
Transportation and insured by Great West Casualty
Company. Great West compensated M&P for die
damage done to the truck.
13 On May 13, 1998, pursuant to the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, see Utah Code Ann.
§§63-30-1 to -38 (1997 & Supp. 2000), Morris filed
a notice of claim against the Utah Department of
Transportation (UDOT). See Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-11 (Supp. 2000).l The claim asserted that the
cow's foray onto the highway resultedfromUDOTs
negligence in maintaining its roadside fence and that
"[Morris] sustained serious injury to his person as
well as significant damage to his semi-tractor in this
collision — The damage to claimant's semi exceeds
$48,000.00." Neither Great West nor M&P ever filed
their own notice of claim for the vehicle damage.
14 UDOT denied Morris's claim, so on February 10,
1999, Morris and his wife filed a personal injury suit
against UDOT.2 The complaint was later amended to
add Great West, which sought to recoverfromUDOT
the sum it paid M&P for the vehicle damage.

J5 On October 8,1999, UDOTmoved for summary
judgment against Great West, "arguing that threat
West's failure to file a notice of claim barred it'from
pursuing a lawsuit 'against UDOT., Great West
opposed this motion by arguing that the notice of
claimfiledby Mocris was sufficient to put UDOT on
notice of the property damage claim now being
asserted by Great West. The trial court granted
UDOTs Motion for Summary Judgment Great West
appeals.3
. ,. '~: -~ .*
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
16 TTxe sole issue on appeal is whether Great West
can rely upon a timely notice of claim filed by
Morris, on his own behalf, that identifies the loss
sustained by Greal West but fails to reference Great
West as a party to the claim. Summary judgment is
proper only if there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. See Harward v. Utah County, 2000 UT
App 222,16, 63 PJd 1140. We review summary
judgment determinations for correctness, according
no particular deference to the trial court, and evaluate
die facts and inferences in the light most favorable to
the non- moving party. See Tollman v. City of
Hurricane, 1999 UT 55,11,985 P.2d 892.
ANALYSIS
17 Great West argues that Morris's notice of claim
was legally sufficient to notify UDOT of Great West's
property damage claim! Relying upon Moreno v.
Board of Education, 926 P.2d 886 (Utah 1996), Great
West contends that, as the real party in interest, it
should be able to "piggyback" on Morris's notice of
claim for the vehicle damage.
18 The Governmental Immunity Act requires that
[a]ny person having a claim for injury against
a governmental entity, or against its employee
for an act or omission occurring during the
performance of the employee's duties, within
the scope of employment, or under color of
authority shall file a written notice of claim
with the entity before maintaining an action
Utah Gxie Ann. §63-30-11 (2) (Supp. 2000). A notice
of claim must contain "(i) a brief statement of the
facts; (ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and (iii) the
damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are
known." Id. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a). In addition, the notice
"shall b e . . . signed by the person making the claim
or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal
guardian[.]" Id. §63-30-1 l(3)(b)(i). The notice of
claim must befiledwith both the attorney general and
the agency concerned within one year after the claim
arises, or the claim is barred. See id. §63-30-12. See
also Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,118,
977 P.2d 1201 ("Failure to file such notice [of claim]
deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.").
19 Utah courts have held that the notice provisions
of the Governmental Immunity Act are to be strictly
construed and that "full compliance with its
requirements is a condition precedent to therightto
maintain a suit" Scarborough v. Granite Sch. Dist.,
531 P.2d 480,482 (Utah 1975). In general, even in
situations where a governmental agency may be given
actual notice of a party's claim, the party must still file
a notice of claim in full compliance with the statute in
order to pursue its claim. See Rushton, 1999 UT 36 at
119.
110
However, the Utah Suoreme Court in Mnrenn
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did loosen the standard for evaluating the adequacy of
notices of claim to something less than "strict
comp!ianceH in certain situations.4 Moreno involved
the drowning of a boy named Bill in a swimming
pool owned and operated by Jordan School District.
See 926 P.2d at 887. Several years before, the
Morenos were awarded permanent custody and
guardianship of Bill, but the parental rights of Bill's
natural mother, Laura Bartlett, were never terminated.
See id. Following Bill's death, the Morenos filed a
notice of claim, on (heir own behalf, seeking to
recover damages for the wrongful death of "their"
child under Utah Code Ann. §78-11-6 (1996).$ See
926 P.2d at 887. When the school district denied the
Morenos' claim, they filed a wrongful death suit in
district court. See id.
|11
The school district moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the Morenos could not
maintain their wrongful death action because they
were Bill's guardians, not his heirs. See id. At the
same time, Bartlett sought to intervene in the action,
asserting that she was the real party in interest. See id.
at 887-88. However, Bartlett had never filed a notice
of claim- timely or otherwise-and the school district
argued that her failure barred her claim and therefore
she should not be allowed to intervene. See id. at 888.
^12
The trial court denied the school district's
summary judgment motion, ruling that the Morenos
could bring the action on their own behalf. See id.
The trial court also denied Bartlett's intervention
motion, ruling that the Morenos were the real party in
interest. See id.
^13
On appeal, the Supreme Court found that
section 78-11-6 gave the Morenos the right to bring
a wrongful death action but only "in behalf of the
ward's heirs," id. at 890, in this case Bill's natural
mother, Bartlett. See id. at 889-90. Because the
Morenos had the authority as Bill's guardians to
maintain an action for his wrongful death, albeit not
in their own behalf, then "it follows that the guardian
ha[d] the authority to file the prerequisite notice of
claim." See id. at 892.
^14
Despite her failure to file a notice of claim,
the Supreme Court allowed Bartlett to "piggyback"
on the Morenos' notice of claim and intervene in the
action they filed. See id. The Court held that the
notice of claim was sufficiently in compliance with
section 63-30-11 for Bartlett to pursue her claim
despite a clear defect in the notice: it claimed
damages for the Morenos' loss instead of for Bartlett,
the legally viable claimant. See id.; Utah Code Ann.
§63-30-1 l(3)(a)(iii) (Supp. 2000) (providing notice
must state "damages incurred by the claimant so far
as they are known") (emphasis added). Overlooking
the technical defect in the notice of claim, the Court
found that the notice of claim gave the school district
sufficient notice of all the facts surrounding the claim,
the nature of the claim, and the amount of damages
that would be sought—even though the Court noted
that Bartlett's damages might well be less than those
sought by the Morenos-and was therefore "legally
sufficient to support the maintenance of [Bartlett's]
wrongful death action." Id.
HI5
As a practical matter, and despite UDOTs
protestations to the contrary, Moreno undeniably
served to loosen the strict compliance standard for
notices of claim in certain citnot^*- 6 u

r

_

'27

as Gnat West argues'jn this appeal, t h e Moreno
holding turns on one key concept, namely, the
standing of the party who files the notice of claim.
Only parties with standing to bring an action can file
an effective notice of claim. See Moreno, 926 P.2d at
892. Moreno holds that so long as the filing party had
standing to bring the suit, and thus had authority to
file the claim, a third party entitled to all or a portion
of the same claim may piggyback on the filing party's
notice of claim and maintain an independent suit
against the State. This is true even if the notice of
claim docs not name the third party as a claimant, and
thus is not in strict compliance with the statute. The
effect of Moreno is, in essence, to supplant the "strict
compliance" standard with a standard of "pretty strict
compliance" in cases of multiple claimants with
standing to sue on the same claim.
H16
Morris's notice of claim does not encompass
Great West's claim and bring it within Moreno's
safety net because Morris lacked standing to bring a
suit, and thus to file an effective notice of claim, for
damage to the vehicle. At oral argument, both sides
acknowledged that Morris was simply an employee of
the actual owner of the truck, M&P Transportation,
and had no colorable claim to recover for damages to
the vehicle. Morris therefore had no authority to file
the requisite notice of claim for damage to the truck,
and neither M&P nor its insurer, Great West, could
piggyback on Morris's notice of claim, as he had
standing to pursue only a claim for personal injury.7
fl 7
Although we are confident this is the correct
result given controlling case law, the result is
admittedly somewhat troubling in light of the fact that
Morris's notice of claim, like the notice of claim in
Moreno, fulfilled its intended purpose and gave
UDOT "timely notice" of the property damage claim
against it so that UDOT could "conduct an
investigation" to see if the claim had merit. Moreno,
926 P.2d at 892. Yet, because of Morris's lack of
standing to pursue a claim for damage to the truck,
Great West ;s not allowed to rely on the otherwise
sufficient notice of claim, and UDOT avoids any
responsibility for the property damage resulting from
an accident that was allegedly its fault.
1118
Aside from the niceties of prior case law
adopting and reiterating a "strict compliance"
standard found nowhere in the governing statute, if a
technically deficient notice of claim nonetheless does
what such a notice is designed to do and provides the
State with enough information to become aware of
the incident, conduct an investigation, and make an
informed decision about its liability, the State should
not be so quick to hide behind the cloak of "sovereign
immunity." That doctrine arose when the monarch
was rather antagonistic to his subjects and wished to
insulate the treasury from the just claims of the
peasantry, who were expected to embrace the fiction
that "the King can do no wrong." We know better
now, and in modern America, where the state enjoys
a much more benevolent relationship with its citizens
and has a more realistic view of its own fallibility, the
enlightened sovereign should be willing to accept
responsibility for itsnegligence when the deficiencies
in a notice of claim do not actually prejudice its
ability to investigate a claim, evaluate its merit, and
resolve it in timely fashion. Such an adinctmAnt - *L~

of the Legislature and not this court
CONCLUSION
J19
The trial court properly granted UDOTs
motion for summary judgment against Great West
Even though the standard of "strict compliance"
concerning notices of claim has been softened in
some circumstances by Moreno, Great West could not
rely on Morris's
notice of claim in light of his lack of standing to
recover damage to the truck.
J20
Affirmed.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
121.

I CONCUR:
James Z. Davis, Judge

J A C K S O N , Associate Presiding Judge
(concurring):
122
Unlike the majority, I have no reluctance
whatsoever in affirming the trial court, and cannot
agree with my colleagues' broader interpretation of
Moreno v. Bd. ofEduc, 926 P.2d 886 (Utah 1996).
123
There is no question here that Great West did
not file a notice of claim. Thus, only by bootstrapping
itself onto Morris's notice of claim may Great West
maintain its lawsuit against UDOT. Accordingly,
Great West suggests that under the Moreno case,
Great West may step into Morris's shoes as the real
party in interest regarding the property damage claim.
Great West analogizes from Moreno because in that
case, although the Morenos' notice of claim was filed
on their own behalf, the supreme court ruled the
notice was "legally sufficient to support the
maintenance of this wrongful death action" by the
child's natural mother. Moreno, 926 P.2d 886, 892
(Utah 1996) (separate opinion of Howe, J., joined by
Stewart, Associate C.J., and Durham, J.). The
supreme court reasoned that M[s]ince [Utah Code Ann.
§]78-11 -6 authorizes a guardian to maintain an action
for the wrongful death of his ward, it follows that the
guardian has the authority to file the prerequisite
notice of claim. "Id.
124
The majority's interpretation of Moreno
accepts the analogy, and seems to stand for the
proposition that one party's notice of claim would be
allowed to cover a party who did not file a notice of
claim when each party has standing to pursue the
same claim. Nevertheless, the holding in Moreno is
readily distinguishable from our case. Great West has
asserted no statutory or other legal basis, as the
Morenos had, under which Morris was authorized to
maintain an action or file a notice of claim for Great
West. Thus, the supreme court in Moreno did not
articulate a "substantial compliance" standard, but
rather allowed one party's notice of claim to cover a
party who did not file a notice of claim only when the
first party was legally authorized (e.g., by statute) to
bring a lawsuit on behalf of the second party. See
Moreno, 926 P.2d at 892. Great West therefore may
not piggyback on Morris's notice of claim to avoid
the responsibility of filing its own notice. This
comports with the case law mandating strict
compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act's
notice-of-claim provisions. See Rushton v. Salt Lake
County, 1999 UT 36,119, 977 P.2d 1201; Moreno,
926P.2dat891.
I
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Accordingly, I conclude the trial court
correctly granted UDOTs motion for summary
judgment against Great West I would affirm without
reluctance.
Norman H. Jackson, Associate Presiding Judge
1. As a convenience to the reader, and because the
provisions in effect at the relevant times do not differ
materially from the provisions currently in effect, we cite to
the most recent statutory codifications throughout this
opinion.
2. In his complaint, Morris did not seek to recover for the
property damage to the vehicle.
3. The Morrises have settled their claims with UDOT and
are no longer involved in the case.
4. Consideration of the Supreme Court's Moreno decision
requires some care. Moreno yielded two opinions—Justice
Russon's lead opinion and Justice Howe's separate opinion.
The Court unanimously concurred in portions of Justice
Russon's opinion, and a majority of the Court concurred in
Justice Howe's opinion. On the issue primarily relevant to
this case, Justice Russon's lead opinion did not have
majority support, but his opinion concludes with a helpful
summation of the majority's position on that same issue.
While relying solely on portions of the opinions concurred
in by a majority of the Court, we do not in our citations
distinguish between Justice Russon's and Justice Howe's
opinions.
5. This section states that "a parent or guardian may
maintain an action for the death or injury of a minor child
when the injury or death is caused by the wrongful act or
neglect of another."
6. Significantly, the rule requiring "strict compliance" with
the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act
does not come from the language of the act itself. See Utah
Code Ann. §§63-30-1 to -38 (1997 & Supp. 2000). Instead,
the "strict compliance" standard wasfirstapplied to Utah's
Governmental Immunity Act by the Utah Supreme Court in
Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P.2d 480,482
(Utah 1975). The shift in Moreno from a blanket "strict
compliance" standard for notices of claim to more of a
"substantial compliance" standard, at least in certain
situations, is fully consistent with the more charitable view
taken in many other jurisdictions, which require only
substantial compliance with the notice requirements of the
state's governmental immunity statute. Seet e.g., Brasher v.
City of Birmingham, 341 So. 2d 137, 138 (Ala. 1976);
Woodsmall v. Regional Transp. Dist., 800 P.2d 63, 69
(Colo. 1990) (en banc); Washington v. City of Columbus,
222 S.E.2d 583, 589 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975); Vermeer v.
Sneller, 190N.W.2d389,394(Iowa 1971);Carrv. Townof
Shubuta, 733 So. 2d 261,263 (Miss. 1999).
7. The result would be different if Morris could have shown
that he had an interest in the truck supporting a claim for
some portion of the damage. For example, had Morris been
leasing the truck, been in a joint venture with M&P, or been
the owner/operator of the truck, then he would have had
standing to pursue a claim and thus could have filed an
effective notice of claim. Even as an employee driving the
truck, Morris might have had standing if he could have
shown either that his employment contract with M&P held
him responsible to pay for damage to the truck or that M&P
had informed him, after the accident, that they intended to
hold him responsible for the damage. No such additional
factor, however, is present in this case.
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February 11, 1999

Mr. Stephen R. Crosby
Kane County Commissioner
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
NOTICE OF CLAIM
RE:

Claimant:
Mary Wheeler & Petra Srbova
Date of Loss: 09-27-98

Dear Mr. Crosby:
Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova hereby gives notice of claim
against Kane County. This notice arises out of a motor vehicle
accident involving Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova who were
passengers in a motor vehicle being operated by Dale Wheeler. That
vehicle struck a vehicle being operated by Kane County employee,
Mark R. McPherson.
The accident, happened on State Road 89 at
approximately 3/10 of a mile east of milepost 52.
Both Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova received serious injuries,
including soft tissue damage. In addition, Mrs. Wheeler suffered
a collapsed lung and pneumothorax.
Mary Wheeler has incurred
medical expenses of approximately $8,000 and Petra Srbova has
incurred medical expenses of approximately $5,000.
Sincerely yours,
IVIE & YOUNG

JEFFERY C. PEATROSS
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cc: Utah Association of

Counties Insurance Mutual
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February 11, 1999

Mr. Joe C. Judd
Kane County Commissioner
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
NOTICE OF CLAIM
RE:

Claimant:
Mary Wheeler & Petra Srbova
Date of Loss: 09-27-98

Dear Mr. Judd:
Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova hereby gives notice of claim
against Kane County. This notice arises out of a motor vehicle
accident involving Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova who were
passengers in a motor vehicle being operated by Dale Wheeler. That
vehicle struck a vehicle being operated by Kane County employee,
Mark R. McPherson.
The accident^ happened on State Road 89 at
approximately 3/10 of a mile east'of milepost 52.
Both Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova received serious injuries,
including soft tissue damage. In addition, Mrs. Wheeler suffered
a collapsed lung and pneumothorax.
Mary Wheeler has incurred
medical expenses of approximately $8,000 and Petra Srbova has
incurred medical expenses of approximately $5,000.
Sincerely yours,
IVIE & YOUMG

JEFFERY C. PEATROSS
JCP/jlb
cc: Utah Association of

Counties Insurance Mutual
9S14-2J94

Z 11D W

t57

Hecsipi ^or
ertifiea »Vlaii
, ^ _ _ ^ No tnsurance Coverage Provided
^.tfoswrr* Do not use tor international Man
(See Reverse)

l

fW.O.UM

iwirvMn

rc&rtrwr fl-aw i
i
Certified fee

$ 3S 1
1.10

Soeciat Deuvefv ree

a
eturn fleceiDt brewing
to Whom & Date CenMereo

2

~3fAi_ Postage
& Fses

PSForm380(

arch 1993

Restricted De»v«Hv Fee

\.»0 !

Return Receiot Showing to Wnom
Date and Adciresste s Address

Postmark or Date

s^.e*
1

R. PHIL IVIE*
SHERMAN CYOUNGt
S.W. FENSTERMAKER
JEFFERYCPEATOOSS
DAVID N.MORTENSEN
RYAN J. TAYLOR
JANET Z. SCHETSELAAR*

Ivie and Young
48 North University Avenue
Post Office Box 657
Provo, Utah 84603
(801) 375-3000
Fax (801) 375-3067

<1§9M971)

RAYH.IVTE
(19211990)

DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR.
OF COUNSEL
• ALSO ADMITTED IN NEVADA
t ALSO ADMITTED IN COLORADO
AALSO ADMITTED IN WYOMING

February 11, 1999

Mr. Norman Carroll
Kane County Commissioner
76 North Main Street
Kanab, Utah 84741
NOTICE OF CLAIM
RE:

Claimant:
Mary Wheeler & Petra Srbova
Date of Loss: 09-27-98

Dear Mr. Carroll:
Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova hereby gives notice of claim
against Kane County. This notice arises out of a motor vehicle
accident involving Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova who were
passengers in a motor vehicle being operated by Dale Wheeler. That
vehicle struck a vehicle being operated by Kane County employee,
Mark R. McPherson. The accident happened on State Road 89 at
approximately 3/10 of a mile east'of milepost 52.
Both Mary Wheeler and Petra Srbova received serious injuries,
including soft tissue damage. In addition, Mrs. Wheeler suffered
a collapsed lung and pneumothorax. Mary Wheeler has incurred
medical expenses of approximately $8,000 and Petra Srbova has
incurred medical expenses of approximately $5,000.
Sincerely yours,
IVIE & YQUNG_
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ADDENDUM D

Si

STERBA AND
HATHAWAY

APROFESSIONAL INCORPORATION
215 SOUTH STATE STREET • SUITE 1150
SALT LAKE CITY • UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE: 801 364-8300
FACSIMILE: 801 364-8355

LINETTE BAILEY HUTTON

March 8,1999
Jeffery C. Peatross
IVIE& YOUNG
48 North University Avenue
P.O. Box 657
Provo, Utah 84603
Re:

Your Clients: Mary Wheeler & Petra Srbova
Our Clients: Kane County and Mark R McPherson
D/Loss:
9-27-98

Dear Mr. Peatross:
We are in receipt ofyour correspondence entitled "Notice of Claim" dated February 11,1999.
In this document you indicate that your clients have "incurred medical expenses" as a result of a
motor vehicle accident on the above date. In order for my client to consider such a claim, it is
necessary that the claimant provide us with some proof of injury, and evidence of medical expenses
exceeding the PIP limit. Please provide us with these records, or, in the alternative, please provide
us with the names ofthe claimants' health care providers and have your clients each sign the enclosed
medical records releases.
Please be advised that this does not constitute an acceptance or denial of the "Notice of
Claim," nor does it confirm or verify the sufficiency of the claimants' notice of claim as required by
the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 etseq.
Sincerely,
STIRBA& HATHAWAY

LinetteB. Hutton
LBKjcp
cc:DougAkr—•—

CONSENT TO RELEASE OF MEDICAL RECORDS
TO:

I HEREBY authorize and request you to release to STD3BA & HATHAWAY, acoovof
anv and all records in your possession regarding MARY WHEELER including but not limited to
laboratory reports and evaluations, nurses' notes and physicians' orders, medications and graphics,
specialty services, patient evaluations, consultations and correspondence, operating room records,
admissions and discharge records, progress notes and diagnostic studies, radiology/x-ray reports &
evaluations, MRI's, and scans, outpatient and/or inpatient records, billing and office notes, history
and physical report records, emergency room records, and anv additional documents orthings not
listed above.
A photocopy of this authorization shall be accepted as granting the same authority as the
signed original.

MARY WHEELER
DOB:
SSN:

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
:ss
)

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

day of

NOTARY PUBLIC
My Commission Expires:

, 1999.

ADDENDUM E

r%ai i e v*uunzy Muorney's Office
76 North Main
Kanab. Utah 84741

Jeffery C, Peatross
Ivie and Young
P. 0. Box 657
Provo, UT 84603
REi

Mary Wheeler & Petra Srbova

Dear Mr. Peatross:
As you are no doubt aware, Kane County has turned the claim ov<
to its claim adjusters, who have in turn retained Linette B
Hutton. Please direct all further communications and
correspondence to Ms. Hutton. Thank you,
Sincerely,

Colin R. Winchester
KANE COUNTY ATTORNEY
cc:

Linette B. Hutton
Lamont Smith

